期权期货及其衍生品第八弹.ppt

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1、Chapter 8Securitization and the Credit Crisis of 2007,Options,Futures,and Other Derivatives 8th Edition,Copyright John C.Hull 2012,1,Securitization,Traditionally banks have funded loans with depositsSecuritization is a way that loans can increase much faster than deposits,Options,Futures,and Other D

2、erivatives 8th Edition,Copyright John C.Hull 2012,2,Asset Backed Security(Simplified),Options,Futures,and Other Derivatives 8th Edition,Copyright John C.Hull 2012,3,The Waterfall,Options,Futures,and Other Derivatives 8th Edition,Copyright John C.Hull 2012,4,Equity Tranche,ABS CDOs or Mezz CDOs(Simpl

3、ified),Options,Futures,and Other Derivatives 8th Edition,Copyright John C.Hull 2012,5,Losses to AAA Senior Tranche of ABS CDO(Table 8.1,page 184),Options,Futures,and Other Derivatives 8th Edition,Copyright John C.Hull 2012,6,U.S.Real Estate Prices,1987 to 2010:S&P/Case-Shiller Composite-10 Index,Opt

4、ions,Futures,and Other Derivatives 8th Edition,Copyright John C.Hull 2012,7,What happened,Starting in 2000,mortgage originators in the US relaxed their lending standards and created large numbers of subprime first mortgages.This,combined with very low interest rates,increased the demand for real est

5、ate and prices rose.To continue to attract first time buyers and keep prices increasing they relaxed lending standards further Features of the market:100%mortgages,ARMs,teaser rates,NINJAs,liar loans,non-recourse borrowingMortgages were packaged in financial products and sold to investors,Options,Fu

6、tures,and Other Derivatives 8th Edition,Copyright John C.Hull 2012,8,What happened.,Banks found it profitable to invest in the AAA rated tranches because the promised return was significantly higher than the cost of funds and capital requirements were lowIn 2007 the bubble burst.Some borrowers could

7、 not afford their payments when the teaser rates ended.Others had negative equity and recognized that it was optimal for them to exercise their put options.Foreclosures increased supply and caused U.S.real estate prices to fall.Products,created from the mortgages,that were previously thought to be s

8、afe began to be viewed as riskyThere was a“flight to quality”and credit spreads increased to very high levelsMany banks incurred huge losses,Options,Futures,and Other Derivatives 8th Edition,Copyright John C.Hull 2012,9,What Many Market Participants Did Not Realize,Default correlation goes up in str

9、essed market conditionsThe BBB tranches used to create ABS CDOs were typically about 1%wide and had“all or nothing”loss distributions.This is quite different from the loss distribution for a BBB bond from a BBB bond,Options,Futures,and Other Derivatives 8th Edition,Copyright John C.Hull 2012,10,Regu

10、latory Arbitrage,The regulatory capital banks were required to keep for the tranches created from mortgages was less than that for the mortgages themselves,Options,Futures,and Other Derivatives 8th Edition,Copyright John C.Hull 2012,11,Incentives,The crisis highlighted the dysfunctional incentives o

11、fMortgage originators(Their prime interest was in in originating mortgages that could be securitized)Valuers(They were under pressure to provide high valuations so that the loan-to-value ratios looked good)Traders(They were focused on the next end-of year bonus and not worried about any longer term

12、problems in the market),Options,Futures,and Other Derivatives 8th Edition,Copyright John C.Hull 2012,12,The Aftermath,A huge amount of new regulation including:Banks required to hold more capitalBanks required to satisfy liquidity ratiosMore emphasis on stress testing and the use of historical data from stressed market conditionsClearing houses for OTC derivativesTaxes on bonuses(UK)Limits to proprietary trading,Options,Futures,and Other Derivatives 8th Edition,Copyright John C.Hull 2012,13,