外文文献及翻译：中小企业融资在欧洲：介绍和概述SMEFinancinginEuropeIntroductionandOverview.doc

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1、附录C引用的外文文献及其译文SME Financing in Europe: Introduction and OverviewIntroducing the topic of SME finance and summarising the main findings of the contributions to this edition of the EIB Papers, this overview stresses the importance of relationship banking for the supply of SME credit; points out the di

2、fferences and similarities in the capital structure of firms across size classes and across Europe; observes that while there is little evidence of widespread SME credit rationing, financial market imperfections may nevertheless curb SME growth; and highlights that the changes in Europes financial l

3、andscape - including bank consolidation and Basel II - promise to foster SME finance.1. Introduction Some of the changes in Europes financial landscape should work in favour of SME finance. Firstly, new information and communication technologies contribute, at a lower cost, to reducing information a

4、symmetries between lenders and borrowers, thereby making SME lending more attractive (see, among others, Frame et al. 2001). Secondly, partly due to progress in information technology, new banking methods are being developed and implemented. For instance, banks adopt new portfolio credit risk models

5、 that allow them to allocate and price their resources more effectively.Moreover, the use of credit risk transfer mechanisms (such as the securitarisation of SME loans) is spreading, allowing banks to focus on comparative-advantage activities, notably credit risk assessment, loan origination, and cr

6、edit risk monitoring - all activities crucial for the provision of finance to SMEs. Thirdly, equity capital is becoming increasingly available to SMEs through the development of (secondary) capital markets and venture capital finance. Fourthly, the second banking directive of the EU aims at boosting

7、 competition between banks, thereby improving the terms and conditions of bank finance, including those supplied to SMEs. Other features of Europes financial landscape have raised concerns about a possible deterioration of conditions for SME finance. Firstly, consolidation in national banking market

8、s has reduced the number of banks and has in many EU countries, especially in the smaller ones, increased the market share of the top-five largest institutions . This may be detrimental to SME lending since there is evidence that large banks devote a lesser proportion of their assets to small busine

9、ss loans in comparison to small, often regional banks.1 Secondly, there is evidence (Davis, this volume) that capital markets and institutional investors are gaining ground over banks. Institutional investors are in competition with banks when collecting savings in the economy, but they tend to lend

10、 less to SMEs than banks do. Thirdly, a new capital adequacy framework for banks (Basel II) is in the making. The thrust of Basel II is to better align capital charges and, by extension, interest rates on loans with underlying credit risks. As SME lending is often perceived, rightly or wrongly, as p

11、articularly risky, many observers - in particular SMEs themselves - have been vocal in warning against a (further) deterioration of SME finance. why financing of SMEs tends to be more challenging than financing of large firms. Reflecting these challenges, small businesses often have no other choice

12、than to rely on bank relationships for their external financing while large firms may turn to banks as well as capital markets.We will also elaborate on the benefits and costs of relationship banking and briefly consider the impact of bank competition on relationship banking. In Section 3, we discus

13、s the capital structure of the average European firm across different size classes and review similar results for Italy, Germany, and France. In Section 4, we evaluate whether SMEs in Europe suffer from credit constraints and whether financial market imperfections hamper the growth of companies. Sec

14、tion 5 begins with a brief empirical description of relationship banking in the three countries covered here and continues with an evaluation of the impact of bank consolidation on relationship banking in France. 2. Capital structure of the average firm across size classesIn analysing the capital st

15、ructure of firms, Wagenvoort distinguishes five different sizeclasses: very small, small, medium-sized, large, and very large firms. To motivate this analysis, one needs to bear in mind that a possible lack of external financing for small businesses could show up on the liability side of their balan

16、ce sheet. Looking over a long period and at Europe as a whole, the ratio of equity to total liabilities is broadly similar across size classes and, therefore, leverage is more or less the same for a typical SME and a typical large firm. The ratio of financial debt to total liabilities, which mainly

17、contains bank loans in the case of SMEs,3 is also roughly equal across size classes. However, Wagenvoort also shows that there are striking differences in the capital structure of the average SME across EU countries. The three country studies confirm this result. Guiso shows that the financial debt

18、of small Italian firms in proportion to their total assets is substantially lower than for large Italian firms. Guiso carefully explains that this difference is because many small firms do not have any loans outstanding at financial institutions. Indeed, conditional on having financial debt, the fin

19、ancial debt ratio and the maturity structure of financial debt are broadly similar across size classes. In sharp contrast with the Italian case, Hommel and Schneider find that the Mittelstand (i.e. German small and medium-sized enterprises) is much more indebted than large German firms. Two- thirds

20、of German firms operate with an equity ratio lower than 20 percent, and 41 percent of German firms report equity ratios below 10 percent. This compares to a European average equity ratio of around one-third (see Wagenvoort). Dietsch finds a similar equity ratio for French companies regardless of the

21、ir size. Overall, while the average European, French, and Italian SME does not appear to be undercapitalised, German SMEs are. Wagenvoort also analyses how firms capital structure changes over time. He finds that the dynamics of the financial debt ratio are very different for the average firm in the

22、 small and medium size classes in comparison to the average firm in the large and very large size classes. More specifically, SMEs appear to be less flexible than larger firms in adjusting the structure of their balance sheets to changing growth opportunities. In particular, the financial debt ratio

23、 increases (falls) at a slower rate in growing (shrinking) small firms than in growing (shrinking) large firms. Our interpretation of this result is that small firms have less flexibility in adjusting financial debt in response to changing growth conditions. 3. Finance constraints Is this lack of fl

24、exibility due to credit rationing? The three country case studies draw a firm conclusion: SME credit rationing is not a widespread phenomenon in Italy, France, and Germany. Guiso builds a model that can explain why some small firms carry financial debt whereas others do not. The empirical results sh

25、ow that those firms without bank loans are often the ones that finance a relatively high proportion of their assets with equity. Guiso argues that a negative relationship between the equity ratio and the probability of carrying financial debt stands in sharp conflict with the rationing hypothesis si

26、nce a credit rationed firm is unlikely to substitute equity for financial debt. The absence of financial debt on the balance sheet of many Italian firms is thus mainly because they do not want to borrow, not because lenders do not want to lend. However, Guiso finds that when credit constraints are b

27、inding, size and lack of equity seem to play a key role. So, credit rationing happens more often with smaller firms than with larger firms. Dietsch observes that, except for very small French firms with an annual turnover of less than EUR 2 million, French SMEs do not increase bank borrowing when th

28、eir credit status improves. In contrast with small and medium-sized firms, very small firms with a solid credit standing do raise more loans than their peers of equal size but lower credit standing. In light of this, Dietsch concludes that credit rationing is only relevant for very small firms with

29、unfavourable credit ratings, and he shows that relatively few firms in France have these characteristics. Hommel and Schneider argue that the virtual standstill of credit growth in Germany in 2002 can mainly be attributed to the current cyclical downturn of the German economy. Whether, in addition,

30、the Mittelstand suffers from structural adverse supply-side effects remains to be determined. However, given the large equity gap in German companies, lack of equity is the main finance constraint and additional debt does not seem to be the optimal way forward in Germany. A few qualifying remarks ar

31、e worth making. One needs to bear in mind that the Stiglitz and Weiss definition of credit constraints implies that a firm is only considered to be rationed if lenders reject the demand for loans although the borrower is willing to pay the going interest rate (and to meet other conditions) on equiva

32、lent loans made to others borrowers of the same quality. In other words, according to this definition a firm is not considered credit rationed if it does not want to borrow at the requested interest rate even when the conditions imposed by the bank are too demanding relative to the true creditworthi

33、ness of the borrower. In this respect it is worthwhile observing that interest rates on bank loans are in general substantially higher for SMEs than for large firms.4 Both the empirical findings of Dietsch and Wagenvoort suggest that from a portfolio credit risk viewpoint this may not be justified.

34、It is true that on an individual basis smaller firms are riskier than larger firms because the expected default probability is negatively related to firm size. Banks in general use this argument to defend a higher risk premium on small business loans. But a portfolio of loans to small firms is not n

35、ecessarily riskier than a portfolio of loans to large companies. Dietsch finds that default correlations are lower within the group of SMEs than within the group of large firms. Lower default correlations can offset the higher individual default probabilities within a pool of credits. Indeed, firm-s

36、pecific risk can be diversified as opposed to systematic risk. According to Dietsch, large firms are more sensitive to the systematic factor (the general state of the economy) than small firms. This may be surprising as small firms are usually less diversified than large firms. However, SMEs may sho

37、w greater flexibility in the transformation of their business when macroeconomic conditions deteriorate or improve. Large firms are often locked in to existing organisational structures and technologies. In sum, the higher interest rates observed on SME loans seem difficult to justify on credit risk

38、 grounds only. It could be that SMEs pay high interest rates for wrong reasons. Banks may succeed in over-charging SMEs due to limited competition in (local) banking markets and the lock-in effect mentioned above. Therefore, due to finance constraints, under-investment by SMEs may happen on a large

39、scale while credit rationing in the strict sense of Stiglitz and Weiss 1981 does not widely occur. Wagenvoort moves beyond credit rationing and tests for financial market imperfections that may lead to finance constraints, which include credit rationing but also constraints resulting from excessive

40、loan pricing and difficulties in raising outside equity. The empirical test of finance constraints here boils down to testing whether financial variables, such as the amount of available internal funds, have a significant impact on the firms investment and, thus, its growth. More precisely, Wagenvoo

41、rt estimates the relationship between, on the one hand, firm growth and, on the other hand, cashflow and capital structure. A high growth-cashflow sensitivity is an indication that finance is binding. The following findings are worth highlighting. Firstly, finance constraints tend to hinder the grow

42、th of small and very small firms (i.e. firms with less than 50 employees); on average, the growth of these firms is one-to-one related to retained profits. Secondly, while finance constraints seem to be less binding for medium-sized enterprises, their growth, in comparison to the growth of large fir

43、ms, nevertheless depends more on theavailability of internal funds. Thirdly, highly leveraged firms have greater difficulties in tapping external finance and, hence, exploiting their growth potential. How could one possibly improve the supply of finance to SMEs? It is useful to distinguish between p

44、ublic policy measures and fforts that lenders and borrowers can make to alleviate finance constraints. Wagenvoort briefly reviews the literature on the effectiveness of public lending programmes and guarantee schemes.The main conclusion is that while direct lending and guarantee programmes usually b

45、enefit the recipients and help ease finance constraints, it has been questioned whether they improve the allocation of resources in an economy. Nevertheless a positive net return on public intervention can be expected if intervention reduces information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders and

46、thus helps solving information problems. For instance, public authorities may stimulate information sharing among lenders. A recent study (Jappelli and Pagano 2002) shows that information sharing among lenders increases bank lending and reduces credit risk. Borrowers and lenders themselves can also

47、contribute to solve finance problems of SMEs by reducing information asymmetries directly. As argued above, the establishment of long-term relationships has the potential to achieve this. 4. Relationship banking and bank consolidationIs there empirical evidence to support the view that relationship

48、banking can mitigate finance constraints? Ongena and Smith (2000) report substantial variation in the average number of bank-firm relationships across European countries. The three country studies reviewed here confirm this result and they show that firms make considerable use of multiple banking. G

49、uisos analysis reveals that in Italy small firms keep on average more than four bank relationships whereas large Italian firms diversify their credit needs over more than 10 credit institutions. As shown by Hommel and Schneider, the Mittelstand in Germany relies on a smaller number of bank ties but even the small German firms on average borrow from more than one lender. Very small German firms borrow on average from two banks whereas large