国际贸易外文翻译中国和东亚的外商直接投资.doc

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1、南 京 工 程 学 院 毕业设计文献资料翻译 （原文及译文） 原文名称：Foreign Direct Investment in China and East Asia 课题名称: 中国和东亚的外商直接投资 学生姓名： 学 号： 指导老师： 所在系部： 经济管理学院 专业名称： 国际经济与贸易 2011 年 3 月 南 京 原文：Foreign Direct Investment in China and East Asia Recent Policy Concerns It is not hard to find various analysts, commentators and poli

2、cymakers in Asia who have voiced concerns about the emergence of China and that China is adversely affecting direct investment flows into their economies. In November 2002, Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong (who has since become the Prime Minister of Singapore) commented that “Southe

3、ast Asian countries are under intense competitive pressure, as their former activities, especially labor-intensive manufacturing, migrate to China. One indicator of this massive shift is the fact that Southeast Asia used to attract twice as much foreign direct investment as Northeast Asia, but the r

4、atio is reversed.” (ChinaOnline November 14, 2002). According to KOTRA, the state-run trade and investment promotion agency of the Republic of Korea, the rate of foreign direct investment in most Asian countries is falling as global investors are being drawn to invest in China (Republic of Korea Tim

5、es August 27, 2002). World Economic Forum director for Asia, Frank J. Richter, said if the Asian countries do not take prudent and pragmatic steps to be as competitive as China, the foreign direct investment flows into these economies would be adversely affected (New Straits Times-Management Times M

6、arch 9, 2002). Furthermore, Taiwans Vice Premier Lin Hsin-I said that facing the rapid rise of the Mainland Chinese economy, Taiwan would have to take effective measures to increase its competitiveness. Taiwan has to implement the “go south” policy to encourage Taiwan to switch their investments fro

7、m the Mainland to Southeast Asian countries (Taiwanese Central News Agency November 21, 2002). Is Chinas FDI policy a friend or an enemy to its Asian neighbors? What determines foreign direct investment flows into the Asian and other economies? Is there a “China Effect”? To get some insights as to w

8、hat methodology we should pursue, we now look at selectively some relevant academic literature. Brainard (1997) empirically examines the determinants of the ratio of U.S. export sales to total foreign sales (the sum of export sales by sales by foreign affiliates) by industry. She uses a framework of

9、 focusing on factors that favor concentration of production (i.e. favoring exports) vs. proximity to overseas customers (i.e. favoring sales by foreign affiliates). The explanatory variables include freight costs to the export market, tariffs of the host country, per capita gross domestic product, c

10、orporate tax rates, measures of trade and foreign direct investment openness, measures of plant scale economies and corporate scale economies. She also adds a dummy representing whether a country has a political coup in the last decade. In her random effects estimation, almost all the variables have

11、 the right signs and are significant. The major exception is the corporate tax rates, which has the opposite sign as predicted. Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova (1998) focus on policy reforms in developing countries as determinants of foreign direct investment inflows. They employ both ordinary least

12、 squares as well as panel estimations. The expected rates of growth, the corporate tax rates, the degree of corruption and the degree of openness to foreign direct investment are all important determinants of foreign direct investment flows into these economies. Hines (1995) and Wei (1997) both exam

13、ine the impact of institutional factors on foreign direct investment. By employing a corruption index, Hines shows that after 1977, U.S. foreign direct investment grew faster in less corrupt countries. Wei (1997) uses OECD direct investment data and shows that both corruption and tax rates have nega

14、tive effects on foreign direct investment flows. Weis estimations are cross-sectional. The Empirical Model In this section we provide an empirical model to estimate the impact of China on the inward direct investment of various Asian economies. The economies we examine include Hong Kong, Singapore,

15、Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia.3 The years examined in this analysis are from 1985 to 2001. The strategy here is to control for all the standard explanatory variables of foreign direct investment in the Asian economies. But we add an additional variable

16、representing the China factor. To proxy for the China Effect, we choose the level of the inflow of Chinas foreign direct investment. Obviously Chinese inward foreign direct investment can also be dependent on the inward direct investment of these Asian economies as well as the standard explanatory v

17、ariables. In order to capture such a reciprocal relationship between the inflow of FDI in China and that in other Asian economies, the FDI equation for both the Asian economies and China are estimated simultaneously. The basic regression model for inward foreign direct investment for Asian countries

18、 and for China are written as a linear specification of the following form: ln(AFDIi,t) = 0 + 1ln(CLNFDI,t) + 1ln(AGROWTHi,t) + 2ln(ACORRUPTi,t) + 3ln(ADUTYi,t) + 4ln(AGOVi,t) + 5ln(AWAGEi,t) 2 Other related literature includes Bao, Chang, Sachs and Woo (2002), Fung, Iizaka and Siu (2003), Zhang and

19、 Song (2001), etc. ) + ln(ATEL) + ln(AINCOME) + ln(OUTFLOW) +6ln(AOPENi,t)+7ln(AILLITi,t) + 8ln(ACPTAXi,t9i,t10i,t11tln(CLNFDIt) = 0 + 1ln(AFDIi,t) + 1ln(CGROWTHt) + 2ln(CCORUPTt) 3ln(CDUTYt) + 4ln(CGOVt) + 5ln(CWAGEt) + 6ln(COPEN t) + 7ln(CINCOMEt) where the subscript “i” and “t” stands for country

20、 i at period t and the variables used in this analysis are defined below. AFDI i,t : the level of inward foreign direct investment in the ith Asian economies in year t. CLNFDI t : inward foreign direct investment into China in year t. AGROWTH i,t : growth rate of GDP of country i at time t. CGROWTH

21、t : growth rate of GDP of China at time t. ACORRUPT i,t : an index of corruption of county i at time t. CCORRUPT t : an index of corruption of China at time t. ADUTYi,t : import duty of country i at time t. CDUTYt : import duty of China at time t. AWAGE i,t : average wage in manufacturing of country

22、 i at time t. CWAGE t : average wage in manufacturing of China at time t. AOPEN i,t : the share of exports and imports in GDP of country i at time t. COPEN t : the share of exports and imports in GDP of China at time t. AILLIT i,t : the percentage of people who are illiterate of country i at time t.

23、 3 In future studies, we intend to include other Asian economies such as India and Pakistan. ATAX i,t : corporate tax rate of country i at time t. AGOV i,t : an index of government stability of country i at time t. CGOV t : an index of government stability of China at time t. ATEL i,t : number of te

24、lephone mainlines per 1,000 people of country i at time t. AINCOME i,t : per capita GDP of country i at time t. CINCOME t : per capita GDP of China at time t OUTFLOWt total outflows of direct investment to the world at time t The independent variables examined in the analysis are believed to exert a

25、n influence on inward foreign direct investment in each country of Asia and China by changing the investment environment through institutional and policy changes as well as the relevant economic conditions. The main variable that we shall examine in this paper is the proxy for the China effect CLNFD

26、I. There are at least two aspects that we should consider here. First, in examining which low-wage export platform to locate, multinationals may choose between investing in China vs. investing in another Asian country, say Thailand. In this case, the multinationals will study the whole host of facto

27、rs, including wage rates, political risks, infrastructure, etc. that would make a country desirable as a site for low-cost production. Investing in China will then reduce the FDI in another Asian economy, say Thailand. The sign of CLNFDI, according to this argument is negative. We shall call this th

28、e “investment-diversion effect”. The second aspect is the production and resource linkages between a growing China and the rest of Asia. In manufacturing, this takes of the form of further specialization and growing fragmentation of the production processes. An investor sets up factories in both Chi

29、na and Thailand to take advantage of their respective competitiveness in distinct stages of productions. Components and parts are then traded among China and other Asian economies. An increase in Chinas FDI is then positively related to an increase in Thailands FDI. A different but complementary arg

30、ument is that as China grows, its market size increases and its appetite for minerals and resources also rises. Subsequently, foreign firms rush into China to produce in China and to sell in China. At the same time, other multinationals also invest in other parts of Asia to extract minerals and reso

31、urces to export to fast growing China in need of a whole spectrum of raw materials. This line of reasoning leads one to predict that the sign of CLNFDI to be positive. We call this effect the “investment-creation effect”. Theoretically we cannot determine a prior the net effect of investment-creatio

32、n and investment-diversion for China. It is thus important to examine this issue empirically, as we attempt to do in this paper. A substantial literature has developed confirming empirically the importance of the size of the host market and the growth factor measured by GDP per capita or GDP growth.

33、 The foreign investors that target the local market are assumed to be more attracted to the country with higher growth rate of GDP as it indicates a larger potential demand for their product. The effect of the variable on their investment incentive therefore is assumed to be larger than the effect o

34、n those who are not focusing on the domestic market. Furthermore, for the foreign investors who operate in industries characterized by relatively large economies of scale, the importance of the market size or its growth is magnified. This is because they can exploit scales economies only after the m

35、arket attains a certain threshold size. As the variables (the growth of GDP and per capita GDP) are used as indicators for the market size and the potential for the products of foreign investors, the expected signs for these variables are positive. Since the cost of labor is a major component of the

36、 cost function, various versions of the wage variables are frequently tested in the literature. A high wage, other things being equal, deters inward foreign direct investment (FDI). This must be particularly so for the firms which engage in labor-intensive production activities. Therefore, conventio

37、nally, the expected sign for this variable is negative. However, there are no consistent empirical results for the effect of labor cost on the investment incentives. While some econometric studies have shown no significant role of labor costs, others have shown the positive relationship between labo

38、r costs and FDI. The latter result is often attributed to a level of labor productivity or quality of human capital that may be reflected in the wage variables. The level of human capital is demonstrated to be an another important determinant of the marginal productivity of capital. It has been show

39、n in various studies that skill-related variables are host country specific. When a host country is more appealing to labor-intensive foreign investment that requires a relatively lower level of skills, the importance of the human capital variable tends to be small. On the other hand, labor skills c

40、an be a more significant factor for a host country, in which more capital- and technology intensive investment projects are concentrated. In this analysis, we utilize illiteracy rate as a proxy for the level of human capital. We examine the hypothesis that better developed regions with a superior qu

41、ality of infrastructure are more attractive to foreign firms relative to others by including in our regressions the proxy, the number of telephone mainlines per 1000 people. We also examine the significance of institutional factors in the determination of FDI by incorporating the level of corruption

42、 and the stability of each government. Corruption can discourage FDI by inducing a higher cost of doing business. Hines (1995) shows that FDI from the United States grew more rapidly in less corrupt countries than in more corrupt countries after 1977. Wei (1997) presents alternative explanation of t

43、he large negative and significant effect of corruption on FDI. Unlike taxes, corruption is not transparent and involves many factors that are more arbitrary in nature. The agreement between a briber and a corrupt official is hard to enforce and creates more uncertainty over the total questionable pa

44、yments or the final outcome. Wei demonstrates that this type of uncertainty induced by corruption leads to a reduction in FDI. Political stability of a government can be another important factor to foster the inflow of FDI Uncertain political environments and their related risks can impede FDI inflo

45、ws in spite of favorable economic conditions. Since the indices of corruption and instability assign higher scores to less corrupt or more stable country, the expected signs of the variables, ACORRUPT and AGOV, are positive. Also included in the analysis are policy-related variables, tariff barriers

46、 proxied by import duty, corporate tax rates, and openness to foreign trade. The effect of tariffs on the behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is methodologically demonstrated by Horst (1971). He predicts that in the face of higher tariffs imposed by the host countries, other things being eq

47、ual, MNEs will increase its production abroad and decrease its exports. More recent models highlight the effect of tariffs on FDI within the context of vertical and horizontal specialization within MNEs. A typical vertical FDI can be characterized by individual affiliates specializing in different s

48、tages of production of the output. The semi-finished products in turn are exported to other affiliates for further processing. By fragmenting the production process, parents and affiliates take advantage of factor price differentials across countries. Horizontal specialization on the other hand, involves each affiliate engagement in similar types of production. A typical horizontal FDI can be associated with behavior that targets the domestic economy and is motivated to avoid trade costs. Choosing between engaging in horizontal FDIs or exporting would involve calculat