国际经济与贸易专业外文翻译.doc

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1、 本科毕业设计(论文)外文翻译译文：俄罗斯经济转型期的银行体系和货币政策（节选）作者：保罗.缪林 MOCT-MOST5：53-701992年1月，俄罗斯开始实施所谓“大爆炸”（休克疗法）模式的激进的经济转型。该模式的理论基础主要建立在三个力量的快速和同时活化作用上，即自由化、稳定化和私有化。这个合并策略的预期效果是在一个合理的价格体系、工业调整和国外竞争的刺激下，积极地反映总供给。主要会从三个方面控制缓解过度的直接的通货膨胀压力：从供给与需求的关系作用来影响市场价格；通过开放的汇率制度的经常性往来帐户的名义锚效应影响；而最重要的方式是通过财政政策来对货币供应量和预算支出额进行制约。在俄罗斯，由

2、于产业结构调整的直接后果，在转型的初期阶段，产量下降和通货膨胀的情况并没有排除。同时，这个阶段预期又是健康的，因为它会关注那些生产不需要产品的过时的商品生产企业，而短期内，市场力量又会快速地促使解放的资源用于新私有化和高效率的部门。“大爆炸”模式的政治理论基础是1991年底的一个事实，即苏联的解体为俄罗斯的经济转型创造了必要和独特的条件，时间对于改革者来说是一种缺乏而珍贵的资源。这个机会的窗口有可能随时关闭，为了保证经济变革过程的不可逆性，俄罗斯认为只有“大爆炸”模式能够引进一开始所需要的变化。表面上，政治理论基础强于经济理论基础，但是后来的事实证明，那些走施加了政治考虑的路线和步调的经济改革

3、，很少产生预定的效果。事实上，对于俄罗斯经济转型三年多过程的观察，我们无法避免地感到深深的不安。从1992年到1994年，国民生产总值以年均12%的速度下降，物价水平几乎上涨到了1992年水平的40倍，预算赤字从国民生产总值的4%飙升到了15%。家庭和企业的金融性资产实质上都被粉碎了，卢布的汇率贬值超过了10倍，并且境外帐户和外债大大恶化到了危险的程度。在这样的一个戏剧性的宏观经济情况下，公开失业率的增加少于本来的预期，然而，这完全不是一个好消息，这确实地翻印了继续生存体系中直接援助的某个组成部分，通过保持高的隐蔽性失业率来变相地体现自己。这种情况的存在主要归结于俄罗斯当局没有能力及时地建立一

4、个社会安全网，来解放零边际生产率的工人，和允许工人建立的工业体系，从而实现更有效率的劳动力比率。实际上，这意味着，俄罗斯还没有进行真正的产业结构调整。而且私有化迄今为止尚未对资源的有效率的重新分配作出重大的贡献。一些分析师给了这些消极负面的事态发展一个直截了当的解释，他们认为，自由化、私有化正确的提出和发挥了他们的作用，但是稳定化的部分应该阻止或减弱前两股力量运作时的不平稳，而不是一贯的被追求。货币政策仍然保持宽松。这反过来又使通货膨胀偏差在经济强劲时期，减少了对公共事业改组的刺激，责成国家通过资助中央银行信贷和虚弱的财政执法来干预对他们的支持。因此，国家被迫进行敢于来增加人民的收入。如通过增

5、加转移支付款项和对粮食、能源等一些基本商品的价格进行持续的补贴。这破坏了预算纪律的任何可能性，并在经历了一系列的恶性循环后，把国家带到了恶性通货膨胀的边缘。分析师们诊断得出的治疗建议是一致的，包括在本质上大幅度地降低货币供应量和实行严格的控制预算支出。为了配合这些操作，卢布的汇率变化应该盯住美元。“为了给稳定化进程提供一个重要的名义锚，不仅仅通过它来影响商品的市场价格，而且还通过其规律来影响政府和央行的宏观经济政策”。面对在过去三年里俄罗斯产品输出和人民生活水平的前所未有的下降，一些经济分析师现在已经开始研究替代方法去解释这些事件的原因。而通过这种想法：产生恶性通货膨胀和经济萧条衰退的同时因素

6、的范围必须扩大到包括成本因素和累计实际需求波动的影响。应该对于在以下区域的重要的结构性节机构，如管理能力和金融机构设施，松散效率的后果给予充分的重视。因此，对于限制性货币和财政政策的治疗应更为严格，并要求主管当局对这些结构性节采取果断的行动。本文中，我们将会根据另一种替代性解释，尤其是侧重于那些与常规分析员共同提到的不同的某些货币政策失误，重新考虑俄罗斯将来的经济发展。这个回顾也表明仅靠市场力量无法生成新的工业结构，这仍然是要经济转型成功的必要条件。要想取得这一结果有必要采取几项具体行动，其中包括建立高效的银行体系和金融部门看来是必不可少的。文章分析了在经济转型进程中令人不满意的情况和目前事态

7、的发展。提出了恢复经济的几条建议。过去的教训和将来的议程迄今为止的事实告诉我们，总体战略失败的原因是期望光靠市场力量和政策措施就可以促使结构调整。在一个体制和管理都尚未完善的体系中，贸易自由化进程并不能启动宏伟的新古典主义的弹性，而且缺乏一个有效的金融体系的支持，不能给予任何经济内容的私有化进程。创造性破坏的压力使得在几个世纪里形成的现代西方经济的结构不会在短短几年内由于刺激而产生积极的效果，因此，如今的俄罗斯经济正徘徊在一个不稳定的平衡点上，因为他的特点正是一个分配非常不当和资源无法有效利用，所以必须立即放弃这个战略。在1988-1990年间，俄罗斯银行系统参与了按苏联的水平进行的机构改革的

8、整个过程，在1990年年底俄罗斯通过的本国的银行法，是建立在自主开发的银行系统的基础上，根据法律形成的机构设置是一个传统的两层体系，中央银行主要是负责发行货币，财务和资金，监督以及再融资的银行部门。商业银行贷款给企业的任务是越来越多，尤其是设立联合股份公司。业务上，所有这些银行都是常规普通的银行，也就是说，他们都可以提供短期，中期和长期的的借贷业务。这种结构从制度上来说是正确的，有着许多功能性的特点。由于缺乏这方面的经验，主体规则和条例还都不完善，尤其是缺少关于这方面的最低标准的银行会计，这使得俄罗斯中央银行不能有效的实施对银行的监管。中央银行对商业银行的再融资过程，因为缺乏金融资产而受到阻碍

9、，通常会构成这些抵押品：商业票据和政府证券。特别是如果没有后者，会使融资国库发生系统性的通货膨胀。此外，也还没有真正的支付和结算系统，这使得该系统高度分割，还会阻碍出现一个高效率的银行市场。商业银行也遭受到了一系列的相互关联的结构和功能的问题。这在很大程度上是俄罗斯系统出现的特点这一原罪所引发的后果。1989-1991年在CBR登记的几乎所有的银行，公共机构或者公共机构式的，要建立一个自己的金融机构，这将能够使他们收集他们所产生的存款，并延伸到他们所需要的部分，这产生了独特的情况，即成了数量有限的法人为主要股东、存款人和借款人的银行。在这些领域有效地进行干预并不是一件容易的任务，因为它意味着校

10、准混合行动的政策和机构。如果俄罗斯当局最终能够认识到工业的结构调整是一个能够成功转型的关键变量，执行这项任务就可能会变得更加容易，而且为了实现这个目标，光靠自由化和私有化，甚至是在框架内的限制性的货币政策都是不够的。而必要的条件是建立能够执行革命原则的体系、方法和政策，如货币和信贷，作为索赔的真正资源是稀缺的资产，它的使用比例不足时就必须支付价格。反过来，建立这样的机构、方法和政策，将极大地推动一个适当的和一致的流量技术来援助西部，特别是国际金融机构。不幸的是，目前这些机构所追求的业务战略主要是基于资本转移，引进外资可以可以弥补像俄罗斯这样一个结构转型的大国的财政缺口这件事是值得人们怀疑的。资

11、金流量应伴随着有技术援助的倡议能够产生的内在力量所需要掌握的整体经济的进程。这将加强资金转移的边际生产率，并逐步将财政压力的规模控制回西方社会负担得起的比例。原文：The Banking System,Monetary Policy and Economic Transformation in Russia:1992-1994Paolo Miurin MOCT-MOST 5:53-70Radical economic transformation began in Russia in January 1992 with the diligent application of the so-ca

12、lled big bang model. The economic rationale of this model is based on swift and simultaneous activation of three main forces: liberalisation, stabilisation and privatisation. The combined expected outcome of this manoeuvre is a positive response of aggregate supply under the stimuli of a rational pr

13、ice system, industrial restructuring and foreign competition. Excessive immediate inflational pressures would be prevented in three ways: by the rationing effect on demand of new prices; by the nominal anchor effect of the liberalised exchange rate in a regime of current account convertibility; and

14、most importantly, by the introduction of financial discipline through restrictions on money supply and on budgetary outlays. In Russia, due to the immediate consequences of industrial restructuring, an initial phase of output decline and inflation was not excluded. At the same time, however, this ph

15、ase was expected to be healthy, since it would concern obsolete enterprises producing unwanted goods; and of short duration, since the market forces would rapidly channel the liberated resources towards the newly privatised and efficient sectors.The political rationale of the big bang approach was b

16、ased on the fact that at the end of 1991, when the dissolution of the Soviet Union created the essential and unique condition for economic transformation of Russia, time was a scarce and precious resource for the reformers. There were risks that this window of opportunity would be closed suddenly; o

17、nly an immediate big bang was considered capable of introducing from the outset the genetic changes needed in order to guarantee the irreversibility of the transformation process. The political rationale appears stronger than the economic one, but events that followed proved that economic reforms wh

18、ich follow paths and paces imposed by political considerations rarely generate the intended results. In fact, observing the effects of transformation in Russia nearly three years after the inception of the process, we cannot avoid feeling a deep sense of dismay. Between 1992 and 1994 GNP fell at an

19、average yearly rate of 12%; prices increased to nearly forty times their 1992 levels; the budget deficit soared from 4% to 15% of GNP; financial assets of households and enterprises were crushed in real terms; the exchange rate of the ruble depreciated more than tenfold; and external accounts and fo

20、reign indebtedness deteriorated substantially reaching dangerous proportions. Open unemployment increased less than what could have been expected during such a dramatic macroeconomic scenario. However, far from being good news, this rather reflects the continued survival in the system of a component

21、 of direct assistance which manifests itself by keeping levels of disguised unemployment high. This survival is largely due to the inability of Russian authorities to create a social safety net in time to liberate enterprises from zero marginal productivity workers and permit the establishment in th

22、e industrial system of more efficient labour/output ratios. In effect, this means that real industrial restructuring in Russia has not yet started and that privatisation to date has not yet contributed significantly to an efficient reallocation of resources.Some analysts have a straightforward expla

23、nation for these negative developments: liberalisation and privatisation, they say, were correctly introduced and played their role, but the stabilisation component of the package, the one that should have prevented or attenuated the imbalances implicit in the operation of the first two forces, was

24、not consistently pursued. Monetary policy remained lax. This in turn kept the inflationary bias in the economy strong, reduced the stimuli to restructure public enterprises and obliged the state to intervene in their support through subsidised Central Bank credits and weak fiscal enforcement. The st

25、ate was therefore forced to intervene in support of the incomes of the population, through increased transfer payments and continued subsidies to prices of some basic commodities, like grain and energy. This destroyed any possibility of budgetary discipline and, in a series of vicious circles, broug

26、ht the country to the brink of hyperinflation. The therapy proposed by these analysts is coherent with their diagnosis, and consists in essence of drastically reducing the money supply and introducing strict controls on budgetary expenditure. In conjunction with these actions, the exchange rate of t

27、he ruble should be pegged to the dollar in order to provide a crucial nominal anchor to the stabilisation process, not only through its direct effects on the goods market prices, but also through its disciplinary effect on the Governments and Central Banks macroeconomic policies. 3Faced with the unp

28、recedented fall in output and living standards which has occurred in Russia in the last three years, some economists are now developing an alternative way of interpreting the causes of these events. By this way of thinking:- the spectrum of simultaneous factors involved in generating hyperinflation

29、and the slump must be widened to include cost factors and aggregate real demand fluctuations;- more attention should be paid to the consequences of leaving unwound important structural knots in the areas of institutional efficiency, managerial capabilities and banking infrastructures.Accordingly, th

30、e therapy goes beyond the implementation of more restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, and demands decisive action from the responsible authorities with respect to these structural knots.In this article we will reconsider recent economic developments in Russia according to this alternative inter

31、pretation, focusing particularly on certain monetary policy mistakes which differ from those commonly referred to by conventional analysts (Section 2). This review will also indicate that market forces alone cannot generate industrial redeployment, which remains the foremost condition in order for e

32、conomic transformation to be successful. To obtain this result several specific actions are needed, among which the creation of an efficient banking and financial sector appears to be essential. The unsatisfactory conditions and developments of this sector during the transformation process will be a

33、nalysed (Section 3.1) and a minimal agenda for its rehabilitation will be suggested (Section 3.2).Lessons from the Past and a Minimal Agenda for the FutureThe story told so far indicates the failure of the overall strategy based on the expectation that market forces and short-term policy measures al

34、one could prompt structural adjustment. In a system which was institutionally and managerially unprepared, liberalisation did not activate the magnificent neo-classical elasticities and, lacking the support of an efficient banking/financial sector, failed to give economic content to the privatisatio

35、n process. The Shumpeterian forces of creative destruction, which took centuries to forge the structure of modern western economies, could not be stimulated to produce positive results in just a few years. As a consequence, the Russian economy is now hovering around a precarious point of equilibrium

36、, which must be abandoned urgently because it is characterised by a large misallocation and under-utilisation of resources.Lessons from the Past and a Minimal Agenda for the FutureThe story told so far indicates the failure of the overall strategy based on the expectation that market forces and shor

37、t-term policy measures alone could prompt structural adjustment. In a system which was institutionally and managerially unprepared, liberalisation did not activate the magnificent neo-classical elasticities and, lacking the support of an efficient banking/financial sector, failed to give economic co

38、ntent to the privatisation process. The Shumpeterian forces of creative destruction, which took centuries to forge the structure of modern western economies, could not be stimulated to produce positive results in just a few years. As a consequence, the Russian economy is now hovering around a precar

39、ious point of equilibrium, which must be abandoned urgently because it is characterised by a large misallocation and under-utilisation of resources.Banking and Financial StructuresIn the years 1988-90 the Russian banking system participated in the overall process of institutional reforms conducted a

40、t the Soviet Union level. At the end of 1990, Russia approved its own banking laws, which established the foundations for the autonomous development of the banking system. The institutional setting organised by these laws was that of a classical two-tier system, with the Central Bank essentially in

41、charge of issuing the currency, financing the Treasury and supervising and refinancing the banking sector. Lending to enterprises was the task of a growing number of commercial banks, established as joint stock companies. Operationally, all these banks were universal banks, in the sense that they co

42、uld lend and borrow at short-, medium- and long-term.This structure, institutionally correct, was characterised by many functional shortcomings. The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) could not effectively implement banking supervision because of a lack of expertise in this area and an inadequate corpus o

43、f rules and regulations, especially those concerning minimum standards for bank accounting (which, in turn, made external auditing practically impossible). Central Bank refinancing of commercial banks was hampered by the absence of the financial assets that typically constitute the collateral for th

44、ese operations: commercial paper and government securities. The absence of the latter, in particular, made the financing of the Treasury systematically inflationary. Furthermore, there was no real payment and settlement system, which left the system highly segmented and prevented the emergence of an

45、 efficient inter-bank market. The Minimal AgendaCommercial banks were also afflicted by a series of intertwined structural and functional problems. These are largely the consequence of the original sin that characterised the emergence of the Russian banking system: practically all banks registered w

46、ith the CBR between 1989 and 1991 were created by public or semipublic institutions wanting to build a financial arm of their own, which would be capable of collecting the deposits generated by them and extending to them the needed credits. This produced the unique situation in which a restricted nu

47、mber of juridical persons (state-owned enterprises, their controlling Ministries, local authorities) were the main shareholders, depositors and borrowers of the bank. Intervening efficiently in these areas is not an easy task since it implies a calibrated mix of actions on policies and structures. T

48、he execution of this task might become easier if the Russian authorities would finally understand that industrial restructuring is the key variable for a successful transformation and that for its achievement, liberalisation and privatisation - even in the framework of a restrictive monetary policy

49、- are not sufficient. The essential condition is the creation of institutions, methods and policies capable of implementing the revolutionary principle that money and credit - as claims on real resources - are scarce assets, the use of which a proportionate scarcity price (the interest rate) must be paid.待添加的隐藏文字内容2In its turn, the creation of such institutions, methods and policies would be greatly facilitated by an appr