内部控制 会计、审计、财务管理专业毕业论文(设计) 外文翻译.doc

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1、内部控制 会计、审计、财务管理专业毕业论文(设计) 外文翻译浙 江 工 商 大 学 财 务 与 会 计 学 院 本 科 毕 业 论 文.外文翻译 浙 江 工 商 大 学 财 务 与 会 计 学 院 本 科 毕 业 论 文外文翻译之一The Eect of Auditors Internal Control Opinions onLoan Decisions（节选） Auditor：Arnold Schneider , Bryan KNationality：The U.S.Derivation：Journal of Accounting and Public PolicyJ, 2008（P.11

2、8）（P.13）AbstractWe examine the eect of internal control reports on lending ocersassessments of a companys creditworthiness. We suggest that an adverse internal control opinion can undermine the assurance provided by anunqualied opinion on nancial statements taken as a whole and have anegative aect o

3、n lenders assessments. In addition, we investigate whether auditor size plays a role in determining the eect on lenders judgments. We gather data from 111 loan ocers and nd that their judgments are aected by the auditors report on the eectiveness of internal controls. The lenders assessment of the r

4、isk of extending a line of credit and the probability ofextending the line of credit are negatively aected when the company receives an adverse internal control opinion as compared to an unqualied one. We do not nd any evidence that the eect is lessened by the use of a Big Four auditor. Additional a

5、nalyses suggest that an adverse internal control opinion weakens the importance assigned to the balance sheet and income statement in lending decisions and reduces lenders condence that nancial statements are presented fairly in conformance with generally accepted accounting principles. Introduction

6、This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to examine the eect of internal control reports on bank loan ocers assessments of acompanys creditworthiness. According to Section 404 of the SarbanesOxley Act (SOX), the auditor must attest to,and report on, managementsassessment of the eecti

7、veness of internal control over nancial reporting. If浙 江 工 商 大 学 财 务 与 会 计 学 院 本 科 毕 业 论 文the system includes one or more material weaknesses, management may not conclude that internal control is eective, and the auditor must express an adverse opinion (PCAOB, 2004).Notwithstanding the regulatory ma

8、ndate, the need for reporting on internal control eectiveness, attested by the auditor, is debatable. GenerallyAccepted Auditing Standards require the auditor to obtain a sucientunderstanding of internal control as part of every engagement. Such anunderstanding is necessary to properly plan and cond

9、uct an audit (e.g., the mix of tests of controls and substantive tests). Furthermore, the auditor can issue an unqualied opinion on nancial statements even if a company has material weaknesses in internal control. The auditors report providesreasonable assurance, irrespective of the eectiveness of a

10、 companys internal control. Even when an auditor provides an unqualied opinion onnancial statements, users may view an adverse opinion on internal controls as bad news. William McDonough, former Chairman of the PCAOB, suggests that it is unclear how the marketplace will react when the auditor expres

11、ses an adverse opinion on internal control and a clean opinion on nancial statements (CFO, 2004). A handful of archival studies examine the eect of internalcontrol disclosures on stock prices, with most of them nding negative market reactions to the reporting of material weaknesses (e.g., Whisenant

12、et al., 2003; De Franco et al., 2005; Cheng et al., 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.,forthcoming; Hammersley et al.,forthcoming).The current study investigates bank loan ocers reaction to internal control reports. We study bank loan ocers because this group of usersroutinely analyzes nancial data and ha

13、s an inherent interest in the reliability of such data. Moreover, the eect of credit decisions in the marketplace is far reaching. Because bank loan ocers are knowledgeable users of nancial statements, the ndings of this study may generalize to other sophisticated user groups.We conduct an experimen

14、tal study to investigate whether the disclosure of internal control weaknesses has a negative eect on bank loan ocersassessments of risk and, in turn,the likelihood of granting a loan. The use of an experimental approach allows us to completely control the information that is available to participan

15、ts. We are able to control for factors that can create浙 江 工 商 大 学 财 务 与 会 计 学 院 本 科 毕 业 论 文challenges for archival researchers, including concurrent informationdisclosure, rm-specic characteristics, and self selection. Previous studies (e.g., Doyleet al., 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007a) nd tha

16、t mostdisclosures of material weaknesses are announced by weaker companies and are accompanied by restatements, restructuring, and other bad news. While these studies attempt to control for such problems with self-selection control procedures, the controls are likely insucient. Hence, an experimenta

17、l approach is extremely useful to overcome these problems.We carefully craft two cases in which the auditors opinion on internal controls is the only dierence in the information presented. Archival ndings are mixed as to the eect of internal control disclosures on the cost of equity. Ashbaugh-Skaife

18、 et al. (2007b) suggest that the disclosure of internal control weaknesses is associated with a higher cost of equity. Ogneva et al. (2007) nd that, after controlling for rm-specic characteristics, the disclosure ofinternal control weaknesses is not associated with the cost of equity. Our study is e

19、xpected to shed light on another portion of a rms total cost of capital the cost of debt.In our experimental study, we manipulate the auditors opinion on internal control (unqualied versus adverse), but in all cases the auditor expresses an unqualied opinion on nancial statements.The manipulation al

20、lows us to determine whether internal control weaknesses undermine the assurance provided by an unqualied audit opinion on nancial statements taken as a whole. 浙 江 工 商 大 学 财 务 与 会 计 学 院 本 科 毕 业 论 文审计机构对内控的审计意见对贷款决策的影响（节选）作者：Arnold Schneider , Bryan K国籍：The U.S.原文出处：会计与公共政策杂志J, 2008（P.118） （P.1-3）摘要我

21、们测试了内部控制报告对贷款人员评价一家公司信誉的影响。我们认为，一个否定的内控审计意见会削弱企业的信用保证（该信用保证是由对整个财务报表的无保留意见带来的），并且对贷款机构的信用评价产生副面影响。另外，我们观察审计机构的规模大小是否对贷款机构的判断有影响。我们收集了111家贷款机构并发现他们的判断受内控有效性审计报告的影响。与收到无保留意见相比，当一家公司收到内控审计的否定意见时，贷款机构对扩大信用额度的风险评价以及扩大额度的可能性都会受到不利影响。我们没有发现任何证据表明这样一个事实：因为是四大审计机构出具的审计意见而弱化了这种影响。另外的分析表明：对内控的否定意见削弱了贷款决策中资产负债表

22、和利润表的重要性，并且削弱了货款机构对企业财务报告是在公共会计原则基础上编制出来的信心。导论虽然说是一项管理任务，但报告经审计机构证实的内控效用的必要性还存在争议。公认审计准则要求审计师对内部控制有着充分的理解，这是必备知识的一部分。比如，深刻理解内控对正确计划和实施审计是必须的（例如，控制测试和实质性测试的测试组合）。而且，甚至在一家公司存在重大内控缺陷时，审计师也可以对财务报表出具无保留审计意见。在不考虑一家公司的内控效用时，审计师的审计报告提供了合理保证。甚至在审计师对财务报表出具无保留意见时，报表使用者也可以将对内控的否定意见视为一项不利消息。威廉麦克唐纳（美国公众公司会计监督委员会前

23、主席）认为，当审计师对内控出具否定意见并对财务报表表达明确意见时，市场会作何反应还不清晰（CFO，2004）。少数档案研浙 江 工 商 大 学 财 务 与 会 计 学 院 本 科 毕 业 论 文究测验了内控披露对股价的影响，大部分结果显示市场会对报告中的重大缺陷作出副面反应（例如，Whisenant 等，2003；De Franco等，2005；Cheng 等， 2007； Ashbaugh-Skaife 等，即将发表；Hammersley 等，即将发表）。目前的研究在观察银行贷款人员对内控报告的反应。我们之所以研究银行贷款人员是因为这类人群要常规性地分析财务数据并对这些数据的可靠性有着天生的

24、兴趣。而且，信用决策在市场上的影响是深远的。因为银行贷款人员是财务报表的有效使用者，这项研究的成果也许可以推广到其他复杂的用户群体。我们进行了一项实验性研究，用来观察是否内控缺陷的披露会对银行贷款人员的风险评价以及（相反来说）获得一笔贷款的可能性产生副面影响。实验方法的应用使我们能够完全控制参与者的可获取信息。我们能够对一些因素进行控制，这些因素能够对档案研究者发出挑战，包括非货币信息的披露，企业特点以及自我选择。先前的研究（例如，Doyleet 等，2007a；Ashbaugh-Skaife 等， 2007a）发现大部分重大缺陷的披露都是在较弱公司里发生，并且都伴随着重述，重组及其他坏消息。

25、因为这些研究试图去通过自我选择控制程序来控制这类问题，所以这些控制很可能是不充分的。因此，一种实验的方法对于克服这些问题极其有用。我们仔细遴选了两个案例，在案例中审计师对内控的意见是现有信息中唯一不同的因素。档案的调查分析发现了权益成本内控披露的影响。Ashbaugh Skaife 等(2007b)认为，重大内控缺陷的披露与较高的权益成本相联系。Ogneva等(2007)认为，在控制企业特有特点之后，重大内控缺陷的披露与权益成本无关。我们期望我们的研究能够过一步弄清公司资本总成本中的另一部分债务资本成本。在我们的试验性研究中，我们控制了审计师对内控的审计意见（无保留意见和否定意见），但在所有的情形下，审计师对财务报表出具的都是无保留意见。这种控制使我们能够决定重大内控缺陷是否会削弱企业的信用保证（该信用保证是由对整个财务报表的无保留意见带来的）。