最新世界移动数据竞争分析报告.ppt

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1、UMTS THE DATA STORY,PROFIT OPPORTUNITIES FOR OPERATORS,A Shosteck Group White Paper,Published January,2004,The Shosteck Group,This document may be reproduced without license provided it is not editedand is presented in its entirety.,UMTS The Data StoryProfit Opportunities for OperatorsA Shosteck Gro

2、up White PaperPublished byThe Shosteck Group11160 Veirs Mill Road,Suite 709Wheaton,Maryland 209022538 USA,Telephone:1+(301)589 2259,Fax:1+(301)588 3311,Email:Web:http:/PublishedJanuary,20042004 The Shosteck GroupTHIS DOCUMENT MAY BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT LICENSE PROVIDEDIT IS NOT EDITED AND IS PRESENTE

3、D IN ITS ENTIRETY,TO,OF,IN,OF,TABLE OF CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARYCHAPTER 1:AN OVERVIEWINTRODUCTION.4,ORGANIZATION,OF THE,STUDY.5,SUMMARY,AND,CONCLUSIONS.5,CHAPTER 2:WHAT UMTS DELIVERSINTRODUCTION.6THE UMTS RELEASES.6,SUMMARY,AND,CONCLUSIONS.8,CHAPTER 3:QUANTIFYING THE LOWER COSTS OF W-CDMAINTRODUCTIO

4、N.9,CONTRIBUTORS,UNCERTAINTY.9,COST SAVINGS,AND,THEIR CONTEXTS.10,REALIZINGSUMMARY,THEAND,COST SAVINGS.11CONCLUSIONS.12,CHAPTER 4:QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT OF LOWER TARIFFSINTRODUCTION.13,DECLINING TARIFFS,AND INCREASING,MINUTES,USE(MOU).13,THE INCREASETHE STATUS,ARPU.15AMPU.18,SUMMARY,AND,CONCLUSIONS.

5、21,OF,OF,AND,CHAPTER 5:THE GROWING DATA MARKETINTRODUCTION.22THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE.22THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE.24THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE.25,SUMMARY,AND,CONCLUSIONS.28,CHAPTER 6:THE SERVICE OPTIONS OF UMTS OPERATORSINTRODUCTION.29,THE“SWEET SPOT”,PROFITABILITY.30,VIDEO-TELEPHONY.30MULTIMEDIA SERVICES.3

6、1,THE INCREASING SOPHISTICATION,HANDSETS,AND,SERVICES.32,SUMMARY,AND,CONCLUSIONS.32,CHAPTER 7:MARKET SEGMENTATIONINTRODUCTION.34CONSUMER MULTIMEDIA SERVICES.34NTT DoCoMo.35Vodafone.35RUNNING A“SMART PIPE”.36,CORPORATE ENTERPRISES,SMALL-TO-MEDIUM BUSINESSES(SMBS).37,THE MOBILE LAPTOP MARKET.38,SUMMAR

7、Y,AND,CONCLUSIONS.39,EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,CHAPTER ONE,Our first study concluded that UMTS/W-CDMA will provide increased capacity and,as a consequence,lower operator costs,particularly in terms of voice.,However,to gain the full revenue potential of UMTS/W-CDMA,operators must support data.,This study ex

8、amines the extent to which UMTS/W-CDMA will lower operator costs,how far operatorsmight reduce tariffs,and the extent to which such reductions will increase traffic,revenues,andprofits.In addition,it explores the strategies that operators might pursue to expand data revenues.,CHAPTER TWO,UMTS offers

9、 operators two key advantages.First,through its W-CDMA air-interface and newspectrum allocation,it delivers greater capacity than does GSM-GPRS or EDGE.Second,becauseof its more efficient air interface,it provides a lower cost per bit transmitted than does GSM-GPRSor EDGE.The greater capacity and lo

10、wer cost are now available through Release 99.,This lower cost will enable operators to reduce tariffs and,thereby,generate greater traffic.Greater traffic will lead to greater revenues and profits.,Subsequent releases of UMTS will specify greater functionality and eventual migration to an all IPnet

11、work.This will stimulate more applications and,in turn,revenues.,CHAPTER THREE,Node B base stations will reduce per bit costs to 10.0 to 15.0 percent those of GSM.However,toderive“true”costs,one must account for other network elements,customer acquisition and care,and future declines in network hard

12、ware costs.Doing so indicates that over the next five years,thefull costs of UMTS will fall to 19.1 to 28.7 percent those of GSM-GPRS today or 3.5 to 5.2x less.Such savings assume a fully loaded network.This will occur as UMTS matures at about the endof 2006.,These savings will enable operators to r

13、educe tariffs by 50 percent and more.Indeed,Hutchison“3”in the UK has already done so.,The consequences will be dramatic.Network traffic voice and data will increase by four-foldor more.Average Revenue per User(ARPU)will increase by 50 percent or more.Non-SMS datarevenue,as a percent of ARPU,will in

14、crease substantially.,We examine how this will occur in our next two chapters as well as why UMTS operators will produceprofitable operating margins,notwithstanding what we foresee as major tariff reductions.,1,CHAPTER FOUR,Since 1994,U.S.tariffs have fallen from$0.42-$0.90 per minute to$0.08-$0.12

15、per minute.Asa consequence,between 1998 and 2002,use increased from 123 Minutes of Use(MoU)permonth to 450 MoU.In contrast,during 2002,use in Canada averaged 265 MoU.That in Europeaveraged 120 MoU.,The rates of these countries explain 95 percent of the differences in MoU.Despite rates that areless t

16、han one-half those of Europe,U.S.operators earned 46 percent more Average Revenue perUser(ARPU).,Driven by lower rates,ARPU in the U.S.increased from$39.66 in 1998 to$49.95 in 2003.Abeginning increase has emerged in Europe over the past 18 to 30 months.There,Vodafoneslargest networks have seen gains

17、 in ARPU of 4.7 to 6.8 percent.,Despite intense competition,U.S.operators are experiencing increasing Average Margin per User(AMPU).European operators are beginning to do so.This indicates that the falling tariffs,whichalready are accompanying UMTS,will increase use sufficiently to expand profit mar

18、gins ratherthan reduce them.,CHAPTER FIVE,This chapter examines emerging data use in Korea,Europe,and Japan.In Korea,we show thatnon-SMS data already contributes as much as ten percent of ARPU.This has been supported by arobust packet network and camera handsets.In Europe,we reveal that ARPU from Vo

19、dafonesnon-SMS data has doubled from 0.5 to 1.0 percent over the past year.We interpret this as aharbinger of increased data growth to come.In Japan,we document that with an improved networkand handsets,data subscribers and data traffic escalate.Total ARPU and data ARPU escalate with it.,This sugges

20、ts that legacy European operators will be rewarded for their decision to defer thelaunch of UMTS until 2004,when the technology will have reached tolerable maturity.Because ofthat,subscriber take-up may be more rapid than some operators expect.,CHAPTER SIX,In this chapter,we suggest how operators ca

21、n position UMTS offerings to assure profitability.Thecommercial issue is not which services are possible under UMTS,but which deliver profit.,Operators can provide complex and expensive video-telephony.They can provide less complexand less expensive multimedia services,in particular video-streaming.

22、They can provide a“smartpipe,”which offers encryption,virus protection,position location,multi-user conferencing,and QoS.,To succeed commercially,such services must(1)provide high value to end-users,(2)perform well,(3)be inexpensive to deliver,and(4)be deliverable in large quantities.,2,At present,v

23、ideo-telephony fails in terms of performance and,potentially,in terms of costs.Video-telephony requires real-time delivery on a network that is not yet mature enough to provideit.That failure illustrates the importance of technology maturity.In contrast,multimedia services,in particular video-stream

24、ing of high-resolution images and videos,can succeed.They do notrequire real-time delivery.The network,even in its early stage,is mature enough to support them.,Over the near term,operators who focus on simpler and less expensive UMTS services are mostlikely to profit.With time,handsets will become

25、more sophisticated.Networks will mature.Thesewill enable operators to deliver more complex services than are feasible at present,and to profitfrom them.,CHAPTER SEVEN,In summary,the greater capacity and decreased cost of UMTS will have three essential effects.,First,UMTS operators will be able to of

26、fer services which are not commercially feasible on 2.5Gnetworks.This will enable them to serve specialized segments that they cannot serve at present or,more likely,to expand services to such segments.,Second,UMTS will allow operators to deliver more sophisticated services with higher value.Downloa

27、dable sound will gain audio quality,downloadable applications can be bigger(andhence more capable),and multimedia content can provide increased resolution.This will enableoperators to increase,or at least maintain,profit margins.,Third,UMTS will allow operators to deliver services with much less con

28、cern for capacity.The abilityof UMTS to deliver services quickly to large numbers of customers at low cost will stimulate useand increase revenues.,3,1,2,3,4,CHAPTER 1:AN OVERVIEW,INTRODUCTION,We published our first study of UMTS/W-CDMA in September 2003.It forecast subscriber growthand handset sale

29、s from 2003 through 2007.1 It concluded that for both voice and“data”(non-voice),the primary advantage of UMTS/W-CDMA stems from its greater capacity and loweroperator costs in particular,costs for voice.,In this study,we focus on how UMTS/W-CDMA operators can accelerate revenue andprofit from data

30、services.2,Our previous study discussed three drivers of UMTS/W-CDMA(1)mandates by Europeanregulators,(2)more capacity than GSM-GPRS-EDGE and(3)lower investment and operating costsas network traffic increases.,UMTS/W-CDMA enables high-bandwidth data.However,over the near to mid-terms,itscommercial m

31、erit centers on delivering low-cost voice,and to a lesser extent,efficientlydelivering mixed voice and data traffic.,UMTS/W-CDMA requires construction of a new radio access network(RAN).Operators will realizeits cost advantages only after they have attracted enough subscribers or more correctly reve

32、nue to depreciate that investment.This will occur for the first networks between years-end 2006 and 2008.,Our previous study examined the constraints to UMTS/W-CDMA adoption.We concluded thattechnology immaturity was(and remains)primary.,We pointed to NTT DoCoMo,which,due to limited coverage and poo

33、rly performing handsets,sawa slow initial take-up of subscribers.3 However,subscriber gains accelerated(and continue toaccelerate)as DoCoMo expanded(and continues to expand)its coverage and introduced(andcontinues to introduce)improved handsets.We observed that the deployment challenges of UMTSare i

34、nherent to any new technology and will be substantially mastered by years-end 2004-2005.,We anticipated two to three million UMTS subscribers worldwide by year-end 2003,4 increasing to125 to 150 million by year-end 2007.We estimated sales of as many as 85 million UMTS handsetsduring that year.,UMTS-

35、When and Why It Will Happen:Timetables and Forecasts,The Shosteck Group,Wheaton,Maryland,September 2003.,Hereafter cited as UMTS-When and Why it Will Happen.For further information,see.,UMTS Release 5 specifies an all IP network.This will enable mobile devices to run IP applications written for land

36、line.,That will expand the applications available to mobile users and,thereby,encourage greater mobile use.Technically,DoCoMo deploys a Japanese variant of UMTS,although it is shifting to the globally accepted standard.As of January 2004,we continued to hold this expectation.,4,5,ORGANIZATION,OF THE

37、,STUDY,We have divided this study into seven chapters.Chapter 1 states our goal to analyze how operators can position UMTS/W-CDMA to increasedata traffic,revenues,and profits.Chapter 2 outlines the UMTS releases and their advantages.The W-CDMA air interface provideslower-cost transmission than does

38、GSM-GPRS-EDGE.In the future,full IP functionality will enabledevelopers to write a single application for both landline and mobile users.Chapter 3 quantifies the cost savings that UMTS/W-CDMA provides.Costs will fall as much as3 to 5x below current levels.That will enable operators to lower tariffs

39、by approximately the same,stimulating exponential growth in traffic.5Chapter 4 analyzes the impact of lower tariffs.It documents that lower tariffs increase MoU and,with that,ARPU.Increasing AMPU follows.Chapter 5 studies the data market.It documents robust growth of non-SMS data in Korea andemergin

40、g growth in Europe.Using DoCoMos FOMA network,it traces the accelerated gains insubscribers,ARPU,and packet traffic as the technology matures.It concludes that data revenuesmay exceed industry expectations.Chapter 6 examines how UMTS/W-CDMA operators can market classes of data services toincrease tr

41、affic,revenues,and profits.Chapter 7 discusses market segmentation.,SUMMARY,AND,CONCLUSIONS,Our first study concluded that UMTS/W-CDMA will provide increased capacity and,as a consequence,lower operator costs,particularly in terms of voice.However,to gain the full revenue potential of UMTS/W-CDMA,op

42、erators must support data.This study examines the extent to which UMTS/W-CDMA will lower operator costs,how far operatorsmight reduce tariffs,and the extent to which such reductions will increase traffic,revenues,andprofits.In addition,it explores the strategies that operators might pursue to expand

43、 data revenues.This would also enable operators to provide video-telephony at rates equal to or less than those currently charged for voice.5,11,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,CHAPTER 2:WHAT UMTS DELIVERS,INTRODUCTION,This chapter describes UMTS technologies and how they will contribute to operator profits.,UM

44、TS is standardized by the Third Generation Partnership Project(3GPP).It specifies a core networkand three radio access networks(RANs)GSM-GPRS,EDGE and W-CDMA.6 W-CDMA deliversgreater capacity,due both to its more efficient air interface and new spectrum allocation.The newspectrum enables deployment

45、without interference,in contrast to GSM-GPRS or EDGE.The air-interface lowers cost compared to GSM-GPRS and EDGE.This is W-CDMAs primary advantage.,W-CDMA increases voice as well as data capacity.It provides greater flexibility in managing voiceand data,particularly in later releases.,In common with

46、 all radio interfaces,the real-world performance of W-CDMA will be less than thetheoretical maximum.Industry estimates range around 200 kbps.7 This exceeds the 20-40 kbpsof GSM-GPRS8 and the 60-120 kbps of EDGE.9 Because of its greater speed,W-CDMA facilitatesnew applications,such as video-telephony

47、.10 As importantly,with maturation,W-CDMA will providea better user experience for already available applications.,THE UMTS RELEASES,The 3GPP is standardizing UMTS over stages.As the 3GPP completes each stage,it publishes a“release.”Each release specifies expanded functionality for the standard.At t

48、his time,the threemost important releases are 99,4,and 5.12,Networks deployed so far are based on“Release 99.”13 This defines the GSM-GPRS-EDGE corenetwork,as well as the W-CDMA radio interface.It specifies transmission of“packetized”voiceand data.Voice packets,including video-telephony,are transmit

49、ted over legacy circuit-switches orAsynchronous Transfer Mode(ATM).Data packets may be circuit-switched or packet-routed.,www.3gpp.org/specs/releases-contents.htm#3gRelease1999.In addition to W-CDMA for paired bands,the network may also use,TD-CDMA for unpaired bands.,Hutchisons U.K initially delive

50、red data rates of 64-128 kbps,(Richard Handford,“TIM takes the Lead with Move to EDGE forHigh-Speed Services,”Mobile Communications,March 2003).Vodafone reported that its UMTS network in Ireland“will offeraverage throughput speeds up to 144 kbps,(“Handsets Limit Irish Launch,”3G Mobile,May 14,2003).