管理学与组织学国际主流理论梳理汇编总结ppt课件.pptx

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1、Mainstream Theories in Management and Organization,YADONG LUO,1,组织与管理研究的主流理论,陆亚东中山大学管理学院,Theories of Exchange关于交换的理论 Economic Perspectives 经济学视角 Social Exchange Perspectives 社会交换视角 Socioeconomic Perspectives 社会经济学视角,2,Theories of Environment Alignment关于环境应配的理论 Institutional Views 制度观点 Strategic View

2、s 战略观点 Co-evolving Views 共演观点 Ecological Views 生态观点,Theories of Boundary Spanning关于跨越边界的理论 Boundary spanning theory跨边界理论 Loose coupling theory松散耦合理论 Information processing theory信息处理理论,Theories of Firm Growth关于企业成长的理论 Classical Theory of Firm Growth企业成长的古典理论 Resource-based view 资源基础观 Knowledge-based

3、 view 知识基础观 Organizational learning theory 组织学习理论 Dynamic capability Theory 动态能力理论,Mainstream Theories in Management & Organization组织与管理学中的主流理论,Theories of Exchange关于交换的理论,3,Economic Perspectives经济学视角Transaction Cost Theory 交易成本理论Ind. Org. Theory 产业组织理论Game Theory 博弈论Agency Theory 代理理论Contract Theor

4、y 契约理论,Social Exchange Perspectives社会交换视角Equity Theory 公平理论Social Psychology 社会心理学Social Identity Theory 社会认同理论Social Exchange Theory 社会交换理论Social Capital Theory 社会资本理论,Socioeconomic Perspectives社会经济学视角Economic Sociology Theory 经济社会学理论Network Theory 网络理论Co-opetition Theory 竞合理论,Boundary Spanning The

5、ories跨边界理论,4,Theories of Environment Alignment(or Theories of External RelationsTheories of Change/Evolution)关于环境应配的理论（或关于外部联系的理论、关于变革/进化的理论） Institutional Views 制度观点 - Institutional Theory 制度理论 - Contingency Theory 权变理论 Strategic Views 战略观点 - Strategic Choice Theory 战略选择理论 - Resource Dependence The

6、ory 资源依赖理论 - Option Theory (also theory of firm growth) 期权理论（同时也是关于企业成长的理论） Co-evolving Views 共演观点 - Structuration Theory 结构化理论 - Co-evolution Theory 共演理论 Ecological Views 生态观点 - Population Ecology 种群生态,Highlight of Mainstream Theories (Theories of Exchange Economic Theories)（关于交换的理论经济学理论）,Transacti

7、on Cost Economics (TCE) 交易成本经济学Ronald Coase set out his TCE theory of the firm in 1937, making it one of the first (neo-classical) attempts to define the firm theoretically in relation to the market; but Oliver Williamsons work is much more distinctive科斯（ Ronald Coase）在1937年提出了关于企业的交易成本经济学理论，他是最早（从新

8、古典的角度）定义企业与市场在理论上联系的学者之一；但奥利佛威廉姆森（ Oliver Williamson）的作品则更加出彩。A transaction cost is a cost incurred in making an economic exchange. It includes (a) search and information costs (b) bargaining and decision costs and (c) policing and enforcement costs. It was later extended to coordination cost, gover

9、nance cost, and opportunism between exchange members (intra and inter-organizational)交易成本是指经济交换过程中产生的成本。它包括(a)搜寻和信息成本、(b)议价和决策成本以及(c)执行成本。之后，该定义扩展至协调成本、治理成本和（发生在组织内部和组织之间的）交换成员间的机会主义。TCEs two assumptions: Bounded rationality and opportunism which can be curbed by reputation (rather than the law, bec

10、ause of the difficulty of negotiating, writing and enforcement of contracts)交易成本经济学的两大假设为：有限理性和受到声誉（而非法律，因为契约的谈判、草拟和执行都存在困难）约束的机会主义,5,Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 交易成本经济学（TCE）,Three dimensions to characterize any transactions: Frequency, uncertainty, and asset specificity, which jointly determin

11、e the structure or choice of efficient governance描述交易的三大维度：交易频率、不确定性和资产专用性，它们共同决定了有效治理模式的结构和选择TCE suggests that the costs and difficulties associated with market transactions sometimes favor hierarchies (or in-house production) and sometimes markets as an economic governance structure. An intermedia

12、te mechanism is called hybrid or relational交易成本经济学认为，市场交易的成本和困难决定了有时候选择层级治理（机构内部生产）作为经济治理结构更好，有时候则选择市场更佳。两者之间存在着混合机制，也称相关机制。,6,Transaction Cost Economics (TCE): 交易成本经济学（TCE）Governance Choice 治理模式的选择,MarketGovernance市场治理,BilateralGovernance双边治理,TrilateralGovernance三边治理,UnifiedGovernance单边治理,Investmen

13、t Characteristics (Asset Specificity)投资的特性（资产专用性）,Nonspecific非专用的,Mixed混合的,Idiosyncratic特殊专用的,Occasional偶尔的,Recurrent经常的,Frequency频率,Efficient Governance有效的治理模式,7,What TCE Is and Is Not 交易成本经济学并非,Explains what most efficient form of governance should be, given certain transactional attributes a func

14、tionalist argument给出在特定的交易属性下最有效的治理模式 实用主义的争论What is missing? Politics: Who are the actors? What are their interests? What is their power? 缺了什么？ 政治：谁是参与者？他们的利益是什么？他们的权力是什么？,8,Further Readings on TCE交易成本经济学的拓展阅读,Williamson, O.E. 1979. Transaction cost economics: The governance of contractual relation

15、s. J. of Law and Economics, 22: 233-261Williamson, O.E. 1985. Economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free PressWilliamson, O.E. 1991. Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36: 269-296Williamson, O.E. 1993. Calcu

16、lativeness, trust, and economic organization. J. of Law and Economics, 36: 453-486,9,(Theories of Exchange Economic Theories)（关于交换的理论经济学理论）,Industrial Organization (IO) Theory 产业组织理论Industrial organization is a field of economics that studies the strategic behavior of firms, the structure of market

17、and their interactions (Economics of Imperfect Competition)产业组织是一门研究企业的战略行为、市场结构和它们之间互动关系的经济学。（不完全竞争经济学）A firms performance in the marketplace depends critically on the characteristics of the industry environment in which it competes企业在市场中的表现很大程度上取决于它所在产业环境的特征。Industry structure determines the behav

18、ior or conduct of firms, whose joint conduct then determines the collective performance of the firms in the marketplace产业结构决定了企业的行为，市场中所有企业的行为共同决定了这些企业的整体绩效。An important branch of IO research is Oligopoly Theory seeking to specify the link between industry structure and firm-to-firm rivalry寡头理论是产业组织

19、研究中的一个重要分支，主要研究产业结构和企业与企业间竞争的关系。,10,Industrial Organization (IO) Theory产业组织理论IO has many limitations 产业组织理论有很多的局限性IO has a static perspective 产业组织理论是一种静态的观点IO views the firm as a free-standing and passive entity 产业组织理论认为企业是独立和被动的Structure-conduct-performance is not one way but two ways结构-行为-绩效（SCP）间

20、的关系并非单向的，而是双向的,11,Further Readings on IO Theory产业组织理论的拓展阅读,Bain, Joe. 1968. Industrial organization. NY: WileyCaves, R.E. 1980: Industrial organization, corporate strategy, and structure. Journal of Economic Literature, 18(1): 64-92Caves, R.E., Porter, M.E. & Spence, A.M. 1980. Competition in the op

21、en economy. Cambridge: Harvard University PressPorter, M.E. 1979. The structure within industries and companies performance. Review of Economics & Statistics, 61 (May): 214-227.Scherer, F.M. 1970. Industrial market structure and economic performance. Chicago: Rand McNally,12,(Theories of Exchange Ec

22、onomic Theories)（关于交换的理论-经济学理论）,Game Theory 博弈论Game theory attempts to mathematically capture behavior in strategic situations, in which an individuals success in making choices depends on the choices of others博弈论试图使用数学的方法捕捉战略态势下的行为，在战略态势下，个体决策的成败取决于他人的选择。Traditional applications of game theory atte

23、mpt to find equilibria in these games. In an equilibrium, each player of the game has adopted a strategy that they are unlikely to change博弈论一般应用于寻找博弈中的均衡。在均衡情况下，每个参与者都选择了在一般情况下不会改变的策略。A set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if each represents a best response to the other strategies. So, if all the

24、 players are playing the strategies in a Nash equilibrium, they have no unilateral incentive to deviate, since their strategy is the best they can do given what others are doing如果一次博弈中所有参与者都选择了个人最优策略，这些策略的组合就称为纳什均衡。在纳什均衡中，无论其他参与者的策略是什么，每个局中人选择的都是个人最优策略，所以所有局中人都没有单方偏离的激励。,13,Game Theory 博弈论,Prisoners

25、 dilemma forms a non-zero-sum game in which two players may each cooperate with or defect from (betray) the other player. Under a Pareto-suboptimal solution, rational choice leads the two players to both play defect, even though each players individual reward would be greater if they both played coo

26、peratively囚徒困境属于非零和博弈。在囚徒困境中，博弈双方可能相互合作，也可能相互背叛。在帕累托次优的解决方案下，理性决策将促使博弈双方选择相互背叛，即便在相互合作的情况下双方都能获得更大的报酬。Deriving the optimal strategy is generally done in two ways: (1) Bayesian Nash equilibrium and (2) Monte Carlo simulations (individuals with low scores die off, and those with high scores reproduce)

27、一般来说，有两种获得最优策略的方法：(1)贝叶斯纳什均衡及(2)蒙特卡洛模拟（即得分较低的个体相继出局，而得分较高的个体不断复制再生）A game is cooperative (vs. non-cooperative) if the players are able to form binding commitments如果博弈参与者之间可以达成约束承诺，则称之为合作博弈（相对于非合作博弈）A symmetric (vs. asymmetric) game is a game where the payoffs for playing a particular strategy depend

28、 only on the other strategies employed, not on who is playing them (e.g., prisoners dilemma)对称博弈（相对于非对称博弈）是指在博弈中，一个特定策略的报酬仅由其他参与者选择的策略决定，而与其他参与者的身份无关（例如囚徒困境）,14,Game Theory 博弈论,Zero-sum games (vs. non-zero-sum game) are a special case of constant-sum games, in which choices by players can neither in

29、crease nor decrease the available resources零和博弈（相对于非零和博弈）是常和博弈的一种特殊情况。在零和博弈中，参与者的策略选择不会增加或者减少可用资源的总量。Sequential (vs. simultaneous) games (or dynamic games) are games where later players have some knowledge about earlier actions在序贯博弈（又称为动态博弈，相对于同时博弈）中，行动在后者可以了解行动在先者采取的行动。A game is one of perfect info

30、rmation (vs. imperfect information game) if all players know the moves previously made by all other players信息完全博弈（相对于信息不完全博弈）是指博弈中的所有参与者都拥有其他参与者先前行动的信息。Continuous games (vs. discrete games) allow players to choose a strategy from a continuous strategy set连续博弈（相对于非连续博弈）允许参与者在一组连续策略集合中进行选择。Eight game

31、theorists have won Nobel prizes in economics!至今已有八位研究博弈论的学者获得诺贝尔经济学奖！,15,Further Readings on Game Theory博弈论的拓展阅读,Friedman, J. 1990. Game theory with applications to economics. London: Oxford University PressGibbons, R. 1992. Game theory for applied economists. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Pre

32、ssFudenberg, D. & Tirole, J. 1991. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory, 53: 236-260.Samuelson, W. 1984. Bargaining under asymmetric information. Econometrica, 52: 995-1005Axelrod, R. 1984. The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books,Robert E. L

33、ucas,Thomas C. Schelling,Robert J. Aumann, 1930-,Robert Aumann,John Nash,William Vickrey,16,(Theories of Exchange Economic Theories)（关于交换的理论经济理论）,Agency Theory 代理理论A theory concerns the relationship between a principal (e.g., shareholder) and an agent of the principal (e.g., managers). It involves t

34、he costs of resolving conflicts between the principals and agents and aligning interests of the two groups代理理论研究的是委托人（即股东）和其委托的代理人（即经理）之间的关系。它涉及解决委托人和代理人二者冲突和联合二者利益的成本问题。The principal-agent problem arises when a principal compensates an agent for performing certain acts that are useful to the princi

35、pal and costly to the agent, and where there are elements of the performance that are costly to observe当委托人因为代理人执行的某些特定行为而给予其补偿，而这些特定的行为对委托人有利而对代理人来说成本很高、并且对这些行为的执行情况有很高的观察成本时，就会产生委托-代理问题。Principals do not know enough about whether (or to what extent) a contract has been satisfied. The solution to t

36、his information problem closely related to the moral hazard problem is to ensure the provision of appropriate incentives so agents act in the way principals wish委托人对于契约是否被很好地执行没有足够的了解。解决这个信息问题的方法，与道德风险问题密切相关，那就是确保提供适当的激励从而使代理人按照委托人的意愿行事。Levinthal (1988) maintains that the risk imposed on an agent ca

37、n be reduced by basing individual performance relative to that of other agents, who face similar states of nature.Levinthal (1988)指出可以通过把代理人个人表现跟其他面对着相似性质工作的代理人进行比较，可以减轻代理的风险。,17,Agency Theory 代理理论,Agency theory tries to resolve two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first is the a

38、gency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principle to verify what the agent is actually doing. The principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately代理理论尝试解决代理关系中存在的两类问题。(a)当委托人与代理人的利益与目标出现冲

39、突或(b)当委托人对代理人行为的监督很困难或者需要很高的成本时，第一类代理问题就会产生。委托人很难核实代理人的行为是否恰当。The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes towards risk. The problem here is that the principle and the agent may prefer different actions because of the different risk pref

40、erences当委托人和代理人对风险持有不同态度时，就会出现第二类代理问题，即风险分担的问题。由于委托人和代理人持有不同的风险偏好，他们可能会采取不同的行动。Principals can do two things: compensation mechanisms (the carrot) and supervisory schemes (the stick)委托人可以做两件事情：激励机制（“萝卜”）和监督方案（“大棒”）Agency theory today is used in broader contexts (e.g., parent-subsidiary relations; hea

41、dquarters-offshore units; franchising; outsourcing; client-professional service provider, etc)现在，人们在更多的场合中使用代理理论（例如：母公司与子公司关系；总部与海外分部；连锁；外包；客户与专业服务公司等）,18,Agency Theory 代理理论,Jensen and Meckling (1976) integrate elements from agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop

42、a theory of the ownership structure of the firmJensen和Meckling（1976）整合了代理理论的原理、产权理论和金融理论，提出了关于企业所有权结构的理论。Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that contractual relations are the essence of the firm, not only with employees but also with suppliers, customers, creditors, and so onJensen和Meckling（1976）认为契约关

43、系是企业的核心，契约关系不仅包括与员工之间的，还包括与供应商、消费者、债权人等之间的Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that most organizations serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individualsJensen和Meckling（1976）认为绝大多数的组织都是以个体之间契约关系的连结这一形式存在的。Jensen and Meckling (1976) conclude that the level of agency cost depends, a

44、mong other things, on statutory and common law, and human creativity in devising better contractsJensen和Meckling（1976）得出的结论是，代理成本的大小，除了其他方面以外，还受到成文法和习惯法以及人类在制定更好契约方面的创造性的影响。Levinthal (1988) notes that the repetition of an agency relationship over time tends to improve its efficiency.Levinthal（1988）发

45、现一组代理关系的不断重复可以提高其效率。,19,Agency Theory 代理理论,In economic language, since the first-best outcome could only be achieved in the unrealistic world of costless information flow, our goal must be to do the best we can, to achieve what is sometimes called the second-best solution用经济学的话说，既然最优结果只有在信息可以无成本流动的非

46、现实情况下获得，我们的目标必然是尽我们最大的努力，以获得所谓的次优解决方案。The building blocks of agency theory are information and economic incentives信息和经济激励是代理理论的重要组成部分Agency loss is more severe when the economic interests or economic values of the principal and agent diverge substantially, and information monitoring is costly;当委托人与代

47、理人的经济利益和经济价值从本质上出现偏离时，代理损失就会更加严重，信息监控的成本也会很高。The economic benefits of any reduction in agency loss will be shared by principal and agent in most market situations.在绝大多数的市场情况下，减少代理损失所带来的经济利益都会由委托人和代理人共同分享。It is useful to distinguish two types of agency problems: (1) Hidden action model (moral hazard)

48、 and (2) Hidden information model (adverse selection)区分两类代理问题是有意义的：(1)隐藏行动模型（道德风险）和(2)隐藏信息模型（逆向选择）Moral hazard: a party insulated from risk may behave differently from the way it would behave if it were fully exposed to the risk. Adverse selection: bad results occur when buyers and sellers have asym

49、metric information道德风险：当事人在免遭风险时采取的行为会与其在完全风险暴露下的行为截然不同。逆向选择：当买者与卖者信息不对称时出现的“不好”的结果。,20,Further Readings on Agency Theory代理理论的拓展阅读,Fama, E. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88: 288-307Fama, E. & Jensen, M. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Jour

50、nal of Law and Economics, 26: 301-325Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360Eisenhardt, K. 1989. Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14: 57-74,Eugene F