有效且公平地课税.ppt

CHAPTER 16,EFFICIENT AND EQUITABLE TAXATION,Optimal Commodity Taxation,w(T l)=PXX+PYYwT=PXX+PYY+wlwT=(1+t)PXX+(1+t)PYY+(1+t)wl 1 wT=PXX+PYY+wl 1+t,The Ramsey Rule,X per year,PX,DX,P0,X0,c,P0+uX,b,X1,X,a,ExcessBurden,P0+(uX+1),f,X2,i,x,e,j,h,g,MarginalExcessBurden,marginal excess burden=area fbae=1/2xuX+(uX+1)=X,The Ramsey Rule continued,change in tax revenues=area gfih area ibae=X2(X1 X2)uXmarginal tax revenue=X1 Xmarginal tax revenue per additional dollar of tax revenue=X/(X1-X)marginal tax revenue per additional dollar of tax revenue for good Y=Y/(Y1-Y)To minimize overall excess burden=X/(X1-X)=Y/(Y1-Y)therefore,A Reinterpretation of the Ramsey Rule,inverse elasticity rule,The Corlett-Hague Rule,In the case of two commodities,efficient taxation requires taxing commodity complementary to leisure at a relatively high rate,Equity Considerations,Equity implications of inverse elasticity ruleVertical equityOptimal departure from Ramsey Rule,Application:Taxation of the Family,Under federal income tax law,fundamental unit of income taxation is familyIs excess burden minimized by taxing each spouses income at same rate?Should husbands face higher marginal tax rates than wives?,Optimal User Fees,Z per year,$,A Natural Monopoly,DZ,MRZ,ACZ,MCZ,ZM,PM,ACM,Z*,P*,ZA,Marginal Cost Pricing with Lump Sum TaxesBenefits received principleAverage Cost PricingA Ramsey Solution,Optimal Income Taxation-Edgeworths Model,W=U1+U2+UnIndividuals have identical utility functions that depend only on their incomesTotal amount of income fixedImplications of model for income tax,Optimal Income Taxation-Modern Studies,Supply-side responses to taxationLinear income tax model(flat income tax)Revenues=-+t*IncomeStern 1987 Gruber and Saez 2002,Politics and the Time Inconsistency Problem,Public choice analysis of tax policyTime inconsistency of optimal policy,Other Criteria for Tax Design,Horizontal equityUtility definition of horizontal equityTransitional equityRule definition of horizontal equity,Costs of Running the Tax System,Costs of administering the income tax in the U.S.Types of costsComplianceAdministration,Tax Evasion,Evasion versus AvoidancePolicy Perspective:Architectural Tax AvoidanceMethods of tax evasionKeeping two sets of booksMoonlight for cashBarterDeal in cash,Positive Analysis of Tax Evasion,(Dollars of underreporting),(Dollars of underreporting),$,$,MC=p*marginalpenalty,MC=p*marginalpenalty,MB=t,MB=t,R*,R*=0,Costs of Cheating,Psychic costs of cheatingRisk aversionWork choicesunderground economyChanging Probabilities of Audit,Normative Analysis of Tax Evasion,Tax evaders given weight in the social welfare functionTax evaders given no weight in the social welfare functionExpected marginal cost of cheating=penalty rate*probability of detectionprobability of detection=f(resources devoted to tax administrationdraconian v just retribution penalties,