网络经济与金融的应用【外文翻译】 .doc

本科毕业论文（设计）外 文 翻 译原文： Network Economics with Application to FinanceNetworks and network externalities play a central role in the New Industrial Organization. Many network industries, such as telecommunications, railroads etc., are central to modern economic life. Further, the essential relationships among the components of the network, i.e., complimentarily and compatibility, are present in many non-network industries, including financial intermediation and the exchange of financial instruments and assets. In this paper, we analyze and review the essential features of networks and show their application to finance. A crucial feature of networks is that they exhibit network externalities, i.e., production or consumption positive size externalities. In a typical network, the addition of a new customer (or network node) increases the willingness to pay for network services by all participants. When a new node is added to a network, new goods are created. Consumers demand these goods that were unavailable before. Thus, consumers are better off after the new node was added. The benefits of the addition of an extra node (or an extra customer) exceed the private benefits accruing to the particular node (or customer).As an example of this, consider a simple star network consisting of a central node S and peripheral nodes A, B, C, etc., as in Figure 1. This can be a telecommunications network if S is a central switch and A, B, C, etc. are the locations of the various customers. Customers demand phone calls ASB, BSA, ASC, etc. These are composite goods, each comprised of two complementary components; for example ASB is comprised of AS and SB. Networks are by their nature self-reinforcing. This is just another way of saying that they exhibit positive size externalities. As a direct consequence of their self-reinforcing nature, networks frequently exhibit positive critical mass. This means that no network of size smaller than this positive size, called critical mass, is ever observed, at any price. How does this happen? Because of the self-reinforcing nature of the network, the same price can support two different network sizes associated with quite different utility despite the multiplicity of equilibriums; one expects that, for a given price, only the network that corresponds to the highest utility will be observed. Thus, small network sizes will not be observed, and the network exhibits positive critical mass.A second direct consequence of self-reinforcing is that optimality will not result from perfect competition. Marginal cost pricing on a network disregards the externality and therefore cannot support the first best. This opens the possibility that some market structures (such as monopoly), which can coordinate expectations, might achieve larger network sizes and higher welfare than perfect competition. A monopolist has, as usual, an incentive to reduce output (network size) because his marginal revenue is below price. However, the monopolist also has an opposing incentive. If the monopolist can coordinate consumers expectations so that they flock to the network, he can achieve (because of network externalities) a larger surplus for each consumer, which he can then appropriate. Nevertheless, Economides and Himmelberg (1993) show that, in a large class of cases, the usual output-reducing incentive of the monopolist supersedes, so that he will provide a smaller network and will underperform perfect competition.A third consequence of the self-reinforcing nature of networks is that history matters. There is a possibility of lock-in at a Pareto inferior equilibrium. For example, David claims that there are significant inefficiencies in the standard "QWERTY" U.S. keyboard, that the Dvorak keyboard is superior, and that the economy is locked-in at the inferior design because of significant switching costs, such as retraining and learning costs. Clearly, the divergence of private and social interest, even under perfect competition can be further accentuated in sequential choices where, once a certain design choice has been made, it is privately optimal (and occasionally socially optimal) to keep improving that design rather than switching to a new design. An important consequence of these observations is that, in a network setting, coordination to a particular "good" equilibrium is important. Besides coordinating expectations, this may require joint decisions on investment, or sponsorship by a particular firm.Electronic call markets, where all orders are batched together and executed at once, reduce market price uncertainty and utilize to a larger extent the network externality than a continuous market. Technological progress in electronic computers has made it possible to run electronic call markets where all stocks are cleared simultaneously. Economides and Schwartz (1993a) propose three calls a day (at the opening, at 12:00 and at the close) on top of continuous trading in the U.S. equity markets. Economides and Heisler discuss the theoretical equilibrium of the coexistence of call and continuous markets. Economides and Heisler establish the fee structure for transaction fees in a call market. Traders who enter their orders early are charged a lower fee as a reward for generating extra liquidity in the market.Financial markets exhibit significant externalities of two types. So far we have discussed in detail the positive externalities created by traders through the provision of market liquidity, the possibility of capturing these externalities in a call market, and the possibility of encouraging higher liquidity through early declaration of market participation induced by lower transaction fees for early participants in call markets. A second externality arises because an underpriced output of a financial exchange network is the equilibrium market price. This information is of crucial importance to potential market participants. It shows the potential benefits and losses from a proposed trade done through this network. For the benefit of these potential traders, market price should be reported as accurately as possible. However, the market price established in network X can be used by competing network Y to complete transactions within network Y. Thus, network X has a private incentive to report prices inaccurately (for example to report a large bid-ask discrepancy).Things are further complicated, when one considers the effects of the utilization of market price information by opponents. The validity of the market price established in network X is an increasing function of the size of this network. Thus, it may be better for a small network Y to use the price established in large network X, and not to engage at all in price discovery itself.This presents a crucial problem for the industrial structure of a market of competing networks. As more customers switch to network Y, the validity of the market price established in network X is reduced. Thus, we can end up with price being discovered within a small group of participants and used in a wider group.The search for increased market liquidity drives the markets toward compatibility and increased coordination. Compatibility increases demand for transactions, but can also increase competition as the services offered by the compatible networks become more similar in dimensions that are of importance to traders. Thus, compatibility is not immediately desirable to a network, which has to balance the benefit of increased demand with the drawback of increased competition. Of course, the compatibility standards set by the sponsor are the most profitable to it. These standards may also be set to raise the costs of a rival network. In networks that are set up as joint ventures, there are significant benefits because of the coordinating function of the joint venture in bringing together complementary components. These benefits are diminished, and social welfare may suffer when the partners in the joint venture are in horizontal relationships (i.e., sell substitutes) as well. For example, a joint venture among competitors may lead to price fixing or price coordination that may be disguised as a part of the standard-setting process. From a public policy point of view, it is important to make sure that competition is not diminished by the introduction of compatibility standards and the coordination afforded by a sponsored or joint venture network.In networks that are set up as joint ventures, there are significant benefits because of the coordinating function of the joint venture in bringing together complementary components. These benefits are diminished, and social welfare may suffer when the partners in the joint venture are in horizontal relationships (i.e., sell substitutes) as well. For example, a joint venture among competitors may lead to price fixing or price coordination that may be disguised as a part of the standard-setting process. From a public policy point of view, it is important to make sure that competition is not diminished by the introduction of compatibility standards and the coordination afforded by a sponsored or joint venture network.Network in particular, the Internet's open architecture. Unfettered access to the corporate accounting system at the same time a qualitative change has also increased the sensitivity. In particular, the financial data is an important trade secrets, such as damaged or leak, will result in an immeasurable loss, and thus to ensure safe and reliable financial information online has become the focus of attention. Build a web-based accounting system, the most prominent issue is security. To solve this problem, this paper selects the operating system and software, viruses, hackers, and Trojans, password, etc., put forward the implementation of the network of financial measures should be taken.To implement network finance, network professionals are needed, if the network professional knows little about finance and is only responsible for computer systems, it is unlikely for him to draw much attention in a finance department; because of this, a highly skilled computer network professional usually doesnt want to work in a finance department, and the person on that post is usually under-skilled and lack of experience, not be able to effectively deal with network failures, this will affect the finance work, reducing the efficiency and convenience of network finance. If a network staff is a professional of both computer networks and finance, he might become a serious hidden-trouble; the first reason is that nobody could understand his computer operations, so he can not be effectively supervised. Several major cases broke out in resent time, all of which are caused by network-administrator who were also very familiar with finance, they stole large amounts of money through networks, causing major losses to the banks. This kind of crime could be very convert, which is usually not able to be discovered in a short time.In networks environment, although the non-paper transmission of massage can avoid information distortion caused by man-made factors, but the traditional methods like signature and seal, which are used to ensure the authenticity and validity of vouchers, can not be used any more. If a hacker successfully sneaks into the system, logging into the network with a legal identity, and allocate the money from a security problems of Network Financial remote terminal, how can we verify his authenticity? Such dollars to American banks, In addition, in the current technical conditions, the data transmission accuracy of networks can not be 100%, if a mistake occurs in a business contract due to error in the transmission through network, who is going to be responsible for the losses of the selling part and the buying part.For implementation of network finance, the existing finance software for single computers or LAN will not meet the safety requirement of system security, new finance software need to be purchased or developed; Technical security protections shall be given to every level of the network finance system (Communication platform, network platform, operating system platform, application platform), an integrated multi-level security system shall be established. The finance software should provide complete and powerful data protection, including data storage safety, data operation safety, data transmission safety and safety during data using, accessing and analyzing.In summary, networks are common in the modern economy as well as in the financial services sector. Perfect competition does not decentralize optimality on network, and coordination of participants expectations and investments is crucial for success. Financial networks exhibit two kinds of externalities: liquidity enhancement by size expansion, and underpriced provision of market price information to outside rivals. Both externalities can produce significant welfare distortions. However, markets structures can be established and fine tuned so as to realize more fully the positive externality of liquidity enhancement (for example through interspersing call and continuous markets). Further, the negative effects of the second externality can be diminished by pricing market information appropriately when used in commercial exchange transactions.Source: Nicolas Economides, 1993, “Financial Market”, Volume 2,Issue 5, December, pp89-97.译文：网络经济与金融的应用网络和网络外部性在新产业组织中发挥着重要的核心作用。许多网络行业，如电信，铁路等，它们已经成为现代经济生活的中心。此外，在网络上，就是表现在互补性和兼容性方面。在许多非网络行业方面，包括金融中介和金融工具及资产，零件的基本关系是它们的作为交换礼物。一个网络的关键特征是，它们能表现出网络外部性，即生产和消费的积极大小外部性。在一个典型的网络交易中，一个新的客户（或者网络节点）的加入，将会增加很多那些通过网络服务并愿意支付的参与者。当一个新的节点添加到一个网络交易，随之开始创建新货。而这些商品的消费者在需求满足之前都是不可以使用的。因此，消费者在选择是否加入新节点之前，应该要考虑清楚另外一个额外的好处节点（或一个额外的客户）是否超过了应得的特殊节点（或客户）的私人利益。作为一个例子，考虑一个简单的星型网络的中心节点S和周边节点A，B，C等，如图1组成。这可以是一个电信网络如果S是一个中央交换机和A，B，C等都是不同客户的位置。上海贝尔电话客户的需求，牛血清白蛋白，升序，复合材料等，这些都是商品，每两个互补的部分组成，例如上海贝尔是砷和锑组成。所有的组件，BS等是相辅相成。网络由它们的性质决定，并且进行自我强化。这只是另一种说法。他们具体表现在积极的外部性大小。由于他们的自我强化性质，最后导致的直接后果就是网络经常表现出积极的临界质量。这就意味着没有比这积极的大小尺寸较小的网络，称为临界质量，是观察过不惜任何代价。这是如何发生的？由于网络的自我加强的性质，同样的价格可以支持两种不同的网络具有相当不同的公用事业尽管均衡的多重性相关的尺寸，人们期望，对于一个给定的价格，只有相对应的网络最高的效用将得到遵守。因此，小的网络规模将不会得到遵守，并表现出积极的网络质量的关键。第二个直接后果是自我优化的加强不会引起不完美的竞争。边际成本定价模式在一个网络外部性方面是不确定的,因而不能认为第一种是最好的。这使这种可能性,使一些市场结构(如垄断)，它配合的期望越高,越能获得更大的网络规模和更高的福利。这是一场完美的竞争。好像一个王像往常一样,鼓励减少网络规模的输出(因为他的边际收益是低于价格。然而,王也有反对的激励。如果王能配合消费者的期望,以使他们都涌向这个网络的时候,他能因为网络外部性而为消费者达到一个更大的贸易顺差,那么他就是合适。不过表明,在一个大班级的情况下,通常输出的减少将会导致激励垄断被取代、最后使他只能提供一个较小的网络来面对接下来的完全竞争。三分之一的本质自我恶化的结果,历史网络问题。有可能锁定在帕累托劣质的平衡。例如,大卫声称有显著的效率低下之标准“键盘“美国键盘,Dvorak键盘优越,经济已经锁定在较差的设计,因为重大转换成本,如培训和学习费用。显然,差异的私人和社会利益,甚至在完全竞争可以进一步加强在时序选择在什么地方,一旦某一个设计的选择,这是私人最(和偶尔社会最优)精益求精的设计而不是切换到一个新的设计。这些观察一个重要的结果是,在一个网络设置,协作,一个特定的“好”的平衡是很重要的。除了协调的期望,这可能需要共同决定投资,或赞助被某个特定的公司。电子拆借市场，所有的订单分批一起，立即执行，减少市场价格的不确定性，并利用一个更大的程度上比市场上的连续网络外部性。在电子计算机技术的进步使得电子呼叫运行，所有股票都被清除，同时市场。伊科诺米和Schwartz提出（12:00，并在在开幕式结束），每天上三个电话在美国股市连续交易的顶部。伊科诺米和海斯勒讨论了连续的呼叫和市场共存的理论均衡。伊科诺米和海斯勒确立了在通话市场交易费的收费结构。那些进