外文翻译通过并购创造价值.doc

Creating value through acquisitionsStuart E. Jackson, (2007),"Creating value through acquisitions", Journal of Business Strategy, Vol. 28 Iss: 6 pp. 40 41A caution to readers who like nothing better than a headline-grabbing, out-of-the-blue acquisition: Im not one of you. In fact, as a rule, I am an advocate of organic growth, of growing out from the core of the business in ways that build on established strengths. That strategy is at the heart of a discipline that I call strategic market positioning, or SMP, which is about defending and growing your companys weighted share of the strategic market segments that define competitive advantage within your industry. This may be defined by geography, customer demographic, channel focus, and so on the critical dimensions of scale for your particular business. It is not about growth for growths sake，but about combining the fundamental principles of customer preference and producer economics with the goal of achieving strong market positions and higher profitability through the goal of achieving strong market positions and higher profitability through selective growth. .Stated simply, you are far more likely to increase the value of your company if you can find a way to expand your existing business and achieve increased benefits of scale or scope within your existing strategic segments. One huge problem with most of those headline-grabbing deals: it is hard to create value for shareholders given the price of acquisitions today. Every successful corporation is feeling the same growth imperatives, so almost all of them are looking for growing, profitable companies to add to their portfolios of businesses. Meanwhile, would-be acquirers face stiff competition from financial buyers. equity firms looking for good companies to buy. These financial buyers were not in the game 20 years ago, or even a decade ago. It can take only one or two such buyers with an inflated sense of their own management capabilities to drive the cost of a potential acquisition past what you should be willing to pay for it. The combination of these factors means that valuations of good companies, and even some not-so-good companies, have been steadily creeping upward since the market recovery began in 2001. The upshot? You may have to pay ten times cash flow or 20 times net earnings, or even more, to acquire a good property. This means that, even if you ignore the time value of money, you need many years of profits at the current level to get your money back. So that is the bad news. The good news is that there are definitely situations in which, from an SMP perspective, acquisitions make good sense. The point is to use the discipline of SMP to figure out whether it is worth paying the acquisition premium that todays competitive M&A environment requires. You need to ask: What strategic segment are we entering through this acquisition and who is the competition in that segment? Will the new business strengthen our SMP in segments where we already compete? If we are entering a new strategic segment, can we leverage our SMP in adjacent segments to ensure that we achieve a strong SMP in the target segment? Bottom line, will the new business make the weighted average SMP for our overall company better or worse? One of my favorite examples of an SMP-savvy buyer is Northrop Grumman, which since the late 1990s has used a number of targeted acquisitions to strengthen its SMP and, by extension, its profitability and value. Northrop by the early 1990s was a50-year-old major defense contractor looking hard for further growth. In1994, it paid $2.1 billion for Grumman Corporation, a premier electronic systems firm and the prime contractor for the lunar excursion module used in the Project Apollo moon landings. The acquisition gave the company (now called Northrop Grumman) a strong technological position in airborne surveillance and electronics warfare systems. Nevertheless, results in the late 1990s were disappointing. Northrop Grummans margins in important programs remained anemic and revenue declined from $8.6 billion in 1996 to $7.6 billion in 1999. The central problem for Northrop Grumman was that it had failed to achieve scale through the Grumman acquisition and other recent purchases. Great technology alone was not sufficient. Being the fourth-largest military supplier, without a particularly strong niche in any of its strategic market segments, appeared to be a recipe for further decline.So the company took conscious steps to improve its SMP. In May 1999, it announced that it would buy Ryan Aeronautical from Allegheny Teledyne for $140 million, with the express goal of expanding its reach into key niche markets, including the emerging industry of unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs. Even within the tight-knit defense-contracting community, there were those who asked, Ryan who? The San Diego-based Ryan had only300 employees and annual sales of about $100million under 2 percent of the acquiring companys size. Critics of the deal suggested that Northrop Grumman had overpaid for Ryan by a factor of two or three. But let us apply the four-question SMP test outlined above and scrutinize the deal from the parent companys point of view.What strategic segment are we entering through this acquisition, and who is the competition in that segment? Northrop Grumman felt that the UAV strategic segment was attractive for several reasons. First, there was mounting pressure from the public to reduce military casualties, increasing demand for unmanned technologies. Second, there was an increased need for surveillance to leverage a dwindling number of combat platforms. And finally, new technologies were increasing bandwidth available for remote control and receipt of video surveillance. There were only a small number of companies in the UAV strategic segment, and Ryan was the leading player.Will the new business strengthen our SMP in segments where we already compete? Here, the answer was probably no. Ryan was unlikely to have much of an impact on Northrop Grummans existing segments, including ships and combat fighter aircraft. There was little prospect of sharing manufacturing costs and support functions across the two companies product lines.If we are entering a new strategic segment, can we leverage our SMP in adjacent segments to ensure that we achieve a strong SMP in the target segment? Here the answer was clearly yes. Ryan already had a strong position in the emerging segment. The parent company possessed technologies (especially Grumman technologies) that could contribute to next-generation UAVs. In addition, Northrop Grumman was a savvy and well-connected player in the defense industry, with the contacts to help win contracts for good products.Bottom line, will the new business make the weighted average SMP for our overall company better or worse? This, clearly, was the crux of the SMP test of the acquisition. To justify the cost of the deal, Northrop Grumman needed not just to maintain Ryans leadership in UAVs, but also to grow the business sufficiently to have an impact on the parent companys overall SMP.This is exactly what Northrop Grumman has done. Among the companys 2004 contracts were $1.04 billion for X-47B Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems. That single contract was more than enough to justify the $140 million cost for acquiring Ryan. Other UAV business has followed, and the Global Hawk UAV has played a critical role in the Iraq War.In terms of shareholder returns, it is difficult to separate out the impact of the Ryan acquisition from the string of other, mostly larger acquisitions that Northrop Grumman has completed since 1999. But the companys revenues have increased an average of 26.2 percent annually since 1999, and net income has increased by 20.1 percent annually (to $1.4 billion). The stock price has risen at an average annual rate of 12 percent. Today, Northrop Grumman is the second-biggest US defense contractor (behind Lockheed Martin). Meanwhile, once-tiny Ryan began generating annual revenues more than ten times its acquisition price a clear SMP win.The acquisition price became irrelevant when considered against the amount of new business generated by the deal. Yes, acquirers may pay a steep acquisition premium in todays marketplace, but as the Northrop Grumman/Ryan deal clearly illustrates, there are properties for which you should pay such a premium, assuming that you have a clear view of the strategic market position that you are trying to build.Successful acquirers focus on understanding the strategic value of an asset, measured in terms of either stronger SMP and increased revenues, or higher profitability for the combined organization a value that is often very different from a fair price based on multiples of historic earnings, or cash flow.You can use acquisitions to create value for your shareholders if you know where value hides.通过并购创造价值斯图尔特 · E.杰克逊. 通过并购创造价值J.商业策略杂志. （2007 年），28卷第 40-41页.提醒那些喜欢吸引人眼球的让人出乎意料的收购的读者：我不敢苟同。事实上，一般来说，我提倡有机增长，即在既有的优势上从核心业务中获得增长。这种用以捍卫和扩大公司的加权份额的市场战略以明确您在行业内的竞争优势的策略，我称之为市场战略定位或 SMP，它是一门学科的核心内容。这种竞争优势可能由地理、 客户人口统计资料、销售渠道热度等等 也就是您特定业务本身的规模决定。它不是为了增长而增长，而是把客户偏好、生产者经济学的基本原理与实现强大的市场定位和通过选择性的增长实现更高的收益率的目标相结合。简单地说，如果你能找到在你现有的战略段内扩大您现有的业务以及实现增加收益的规模或范围的一种方法，那么你更有可能使你公司的价值得到增加。与大多数的这些喜欢头条新闻的交易有一个巨大的问题：现今发出的收购价格很难为股东创造价值。每个成功的公司感觉到相同的增长要务，所以几乎所有人都正在寻找业务不断增长、 利润丰厚的公司将它们添加到自己的投资组合公司。与此同时，潜在的收购者面对着金融买家的激烈竞争。股本公司都在寻找好的公司购买。这些金融买家不是像十年前或二十年前一样在游戏。只要有一两个这样抬高价格意识的买家在你面前炫耀一家公司潜在收购的成本，你将会很愿意为此买单。这些因素综合起来意味着估值的好公司和甚至一些不太好的，但在2001年市场复苏以来一直稳步向上发展的公司。结果如何？您可能要付出十倍的现金流或20倍的净收益，或者更多的钱来完成兼并一家好的公司。这意味着即使你忽略金钱的时间价值，在目前的利润水平上你也需要许多年才能收回你的投资成本。这就是坏消息。而好消息是，从 SMP 的角度看，目前肯定是有解决方法让收购能够带来效益的。成功的关键就是使用SMP的原理找出在现今的竞争收购兼并环境中是否值得付出收购溢价。这时你就需要问自己：我们要通过此次收购进入哪个战略领域，该领域的竞争者是谁？新业务将加强我们在已有战略领域中的战略地位吗？如果我们正进入一个新的战略段，我们可以利用我们在相邻区域的战略地位来确保我们达到在目标段中强有力的战略地位吗？至少要弄清楚新的业务将会使公司整体的战略地位得到提升还是下降？一个我最喜欢的的懂得SMP的精明买家是诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司，自上世纪 90 年代末以来已使用多有针对性的收购，以加强其战略地位，并不断地扩展，增强其盈利能力和公司价值。九十年代初期诺思罗普是一家有着50年历史并且努力地寻找进一步发展机会的国防承包商。在1994年，诺思罗普支付给格鲁曼公司21亿美元，格鲁曼是一家电子系统公司并且是阿波罗登月项目中登月舱的主要承包商。这次收购提升了公司 （现称诺斯罗普格鲁曼） 在机载监视和电子对抗系统中强有力的技术地位。不过，在上世纪 90 年代末的结果却令人失望。诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司在重要项目的利润率仍然贫血，收入从1996年的86 亿美元下降到1999年的76亿美元。诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司的关键问题是它未能通过收购格鲁曼公司和其他最近的购买计划实现规模化。仅靠伟大技术是不够的。作为第四大的军事供应商，其所有战略市场部分都没有特别强大利无疑会造成公司的进一步衰退。因此公司应该采取由意识的步奏以改善自身的战略地位。1999 年 5 月宣布它将用130亿美元从阿勒格尼莱购买瑞安航空，明确表明目标是将其活动范围扩大到利基市场，包括无人驾驶飞机和无人机的新兴行业。即使在紧密防御承包社区内也有一些人会问：“Ryan是谁？”位于圣地亚哥的 Ryan仅有300名员工，年销售额约100亿美元 ，其规模不到收购公司大小的 2%。这笔交易的批评家们认为诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司多付了瑞恩两、三倍的钱。但让我们应用SMP原理的四个问题来测试上文所述并且用母公司的观点审议这一交易看看。我们通过此次收购要进入什么战略区域以及该领域的竞争者是谁？诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司出于几个原因考虑认为无人机战略部分非常有吸引力。首先，来自市民的越来越大的压力要求减少军事人员伤亡，这增加了对无人驾驶技术的需求。其次，有增加监督设施的需要来平衡日益减少的作战平台。最后，新技术带来的宽带的增加使得远程控制和视频监控更加方便。在无人机战略领域中只有少数的几家公司，而瑞恩是其中的领头羊。新业务会加强我们在已有竞争领域中的战略地位吗？在这里，答案可能是否定的。 瑞恩公司对诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司的现有战略部分不太可能有太大影响，其中包括船舶和战斗航母。所以减少制造成本以及对生产线的功能支持是的可能性极小。如果我们正进入一个新的战略段，我们可以利用我们在相邻区域的战略地位来确保我们达到在目标段中强有力的战略地位吗？这里的答案显然是肯定的。瑞恩在新兴段已经有了一个强大的地位。母公司拥有的技术(特别是罗普·格鲁曼公司的技术),有助于下一代无人机的诞生。此外,在国防行业诺斯罗普·格鲁曼是一家精明的、声名在外的公司,这有助于赢得好产品的合同。底线是要弄清楚新的业务将会使公司整体的战略地位得到提升还是下降？这一点,很明显,是SMP测试关于收购的的症结所在。为了证明交易成本的合理,诺斯罗普·格鲁曼公司需要的不只是维持瑞恩在无人机领域的领导地位,还要让这项业务的发展足以影响到母公司的总体的战略地位。这正是诺斯罗普·格鲁曼公司做的事情。在该公司2004年的合同是10.4亿美元的x - 47 b无人作战航空系统联合。这单独合约足以证明付出1.4亿美元的代价获得瑞安是正确的选择。其他无人机业务已经紧随其后, 在伊拉克战争中“全球鹰”无人机已经发挥了重要作用。至于股东回报，很难从诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司自1999年以来的其他较大的已完成的收购中分离出收购瑞恩带来的影响。但自 1999 年以来每年公司的收入平均增加了 26.2%，其中净收入每年增长了 20.1% （达到 1.4 亿美元）。股票价格年平均增长率上升到了12%。如今，诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司是 （在洛克希德马丁) 后面的第二大美国国防承包商。同时，一次小小的瑞恩收购开始生成超过其十倍购置价格的年营业收入 多么明智的战略地位之胜。 当时考虑的新业务产生的交易量时购置价格便变得无关紧要了。是的，在当今的市场，收购者可能需要支付一笔不合理的收购溢价，但作为诺斯罗普格鲁曼公司、瑞恩交易清楚地说明了，假设你有试图建立的明确的市场战略位置，那么就你应该支付这笔费用的属性。成功收购者强调理解一项资产的战略价值，无论是从强有力的战略地位、增收情况还是联合组织更高的收益率来衡量 它都是与基于历史的收入或现金流的倍数的平价所不同的。如果你知道哪里值隐藏着价值，你就可以利用收购来为你的股东创造价值。