县级地方政府绩效审计：芬兰和挪威的效益审计效率性研究外文翻译（可编辑） .doc

县级地方政府绩效审计：芬兰和挪威的效益审计效率性研究外文翻译 外文翻译Performance auditing in local government:an exploratory study of perceived efficiency of municipal value for money auditing in Finland and Norway Material Source: The European Accounting Review Author: Age Johnsen ,Pentti Meklin, Jarmo Vakkuri There was an unambiguous, positive attitude to performance audit among the three Norwegian informants. Performance audit was not regarded as an unnecessary mandatory task, but some instrumental task with the purpose of improving the municipal management. In particular it was regarded as an important and efficient tool for control and reform of the public sector. Performance auditing was regarded as a part of a double-loop learning process. The chief administrative officer of the county did, however, point to dysfunctions, which could reduce the chief administrative officers legitimacy. He, in this respect , specifically mentioned the possibility of the councils political opposition taking certain parts of the audit report out of context and imizing the political gain from this, in particular with the active use of media. He furthermore held it as undesirable that the auditors report due to a clause in the municipal act, should promptly be reported to the council control committee. By this clearance procedure he thought that the principle of contradiction was breached. This principle states that the part which is concerned, should have the ability to become acquainted with the content of the document before reporting in order that misconceptions and faults could be corrected. Our informants estimated that 15?20% of the resources were used in performance auditing, but that 40?50% was desirable. Our finds are relatively similar to an earlier Norwegian study of desired and factual use of resources on performance auditing Schwanitz, 1997. She reported results indicating that in 1995 only 13% of the Norwegian municipal auditors resources were used in performance auditing. According to her survey the municipal auditors claimed that the desired level of performance auditing should constitute 30% of the total resources. The performance audit intended functions the 3Es were only partly achieved. The two chief administrative officers thought the main reason for this could be poorly performed audits, mainly due to lack of competence among the auditors. However, they both pointed out that there had been a noticeable improvement of the audits in later years. The informant from the municipal audit, on the other hand, thought that if the resources had been adequate according to the audit tasks, the quality of the auditing would have been satisfactory. The municipal audit had traditionally been inclined towards checking the books and had not had the necessary premises for knowing the risks inherent in the political system. To facilitate this challenge, the municipal audit had also recruited employees with backgrounds and education diverging from the traditional auditing discipline. This recruitment strategy, combined with the establishment of larger auditors through mergers between former single municipal audit departments in order to strengthen the performance competence, seemed to have been an effective action for changing and enhancing the auditors competence. The municipal chief administrative officer mentioned that his municipality had started co-operation with four neighboring municipalities on the establishment of a merged, district municipal auditor, precisely due to the task of improving the quality of the performance auditing. The chief administrative officer also described a performance audit project of nursing services, which was unsuccessful. The reason for this seemed to have been problems of method and that those conducting the project overplayed the conclusion relative to their finds. In so far as there were audit reports of good quality, these were, according to the two chief administrative officers, used actively. The county chief administrative officer had the strong impression that the reports first of all were used by the management leadership and by the politicians. Lower in the organizational hierarchy there was little interest in the work of the municipal auditor. He mentioned that poor quality of the audit reports could be a possible reason for this lack of interest lower down in the organization. The municipal chief administrative officer, on the other hand, had a strong perception that the reports, where they were available, were used by the whole organization. However, he mentioned that there was a tendency for top management to be the most active user group. The chief audit officer said the information which is revealed from performance auditing was meant for the decision-makers and the auditees. These were, according to him, also the same groups which used the reports. The municipal chief administrative officer pointed out that the marginal utility of performance audits most likely was larger than the marginal utility of traditional financial audit. With the use of sampling and the more recent development in audit information technology, this could be likely. On our question if the performance audit was performed to the detriment of traditionalfinancial audit, the informants answered that the resources were fixed. The extension of the scope of operation from mainly financial audit to also conduct performance audit, had led to a reduced emphasis on financial auditing. To this it was added that the situation demanded innovation and new way of thinking on the behalf of the auditors regarding the auditors effectiveness, efficiency, work organization and management. Thus, allegedly, also the municipal auditors could improve their performance. Regarding our two propositions on decoupling and symbolic use of information, the results in general did not warrant us to state that there were widespread symbolic and decoupled use of performance audit, rather on the contrary. It is in this respect necessary to devote attention to the link between performance audit information and the ambiguity of goals in local government. The ways of using audit information are related with the conceptions of auditors, auditees and other stakeholders on the methods of decreasing uncertainty and goal ambiguity and enhancing the legitimacy of public services. Both the cases of Finland and Norway provided some evidence for that It seems to be fair to conclude that performance auditing has specific instrumental functions in local government. Moreover, performance audit reports are used, albeit somewhat differently than might have been expected, by the symbolic and decoupling propositions. Compared to financial statement auditing, performance auditing has a more conspicuous connection to both performance improvement and day-to-day management processes in the municipalities and counties. Particularly, our third proposition mimetic isomorphism under uncertainty therefore is judged to be supported by the findings of this study. Based on our data and judged by the relatively high emphasis on management by objectives and prominent position of private accounting firms in the Finnish municipal audit market, it seems likely that performance audits in Finland were relatively more of the management consultancy style. In Norway, especially due to the low degree of involvement of the auditees in the clearance process, the performance audits seemed to be more inclined to the public accountants style compared to the Finnish case. We think our study has two major implications for theory and practice in enhancing the understanding of how performance audit in political institutions may have important instrumental and political functions. First, it is necessary to pose a question as to what extent performance audit can be a part of the process of determining correct and incorrect goals for local government. This is one of the prominent future dilemmas in performance auditing. What if there are no explicit goals to audit? As was discovered in the Finnish case, this is part of the realm in performance auditing. Not necessarily all the issues that are ex post considered important from the viewpoint of three Es, service quality, equity, justice or other relevant evaluation criteria, have been regarded as such ex ante. Often there are many issues that are of no specific substance at the time when principals make their decisions on priorities and resource allocations, but that are extremely important at the time when auditing occurs. The problem in the intertemporal comparison of preferences makes, not only the decision-making processes of local government, but especially the auditing of those activities and decisions, complicated March, 1978, 1988. The emphasis on value for money clearly magnifies the importance of understanding the processes of goal setting in local governments from the auditing perspective. This applies both to performance measurement and auditing of local government activities and to the use of audit results in improving the performance of local authorities. Thus, seemingly decoupled structures in uncertain and ambiguous contingencies should not be judged exclusively as static decoupled or symbolic phenomena, but rather be studied in a dynamic, evolutionary and political perspective Nelson and Winter, 1982; Baieretal., 1986. Second, performance auditing in local government in its modern form may still be relatively new. Over time, one may expect more loosely coupled but still highly rational use of performance auditing information. By this we mean that due to the institutional context under which different actors employ performance audits, different actors may use this kind of information rationally according to their specific circumstances. For example: the political ruling coalition, the majority, could select and disclose performance information when and if it confirms value for money. Simultaneously, the political opposition, the minority, and the media could select and use information strategically when and if information shows low value for money. Both of these uses are politically rational and, furthermore, use of information externally which is coupled to structures internally in the municipalities and counties. While such processes may increase the level of conflict and reveal different ideologies, this could be exactly what management models in political institutions should do, intended or unintended Brunsson, 1989. However, if it is so that performance auditing in local government could work in such a rational and coupled way as we have depicted above, this may, in the longer run, also lead to a possible performance auditing success paradox. The logic in the performance audit success paradox is that even though performance auditors could be relatively successful agents for society at large as principal in providing performance information as a collective good and thus function as watchdogs for democracy and transparency, the society is not a homogenous entity. The citizens have different preferences and the different political parties and interest groups have their different manifestos and agendas. 译文县级地方政府绩效审计:芬兰和挪威的效益审计效率性研究 资料来源:欧洲会计回顾作者:约翰森,麦克林,耶莫 在挪威,三个被调查者对绩效审计有明确而积极的态度。绩效审计是为了提高市政府的管理,尤其是对一些公共部门的控制与改革,它不是基于任务性的一项活动。同时也是双向学习的一部分。然而,一个县的首席执行官指出:它有一些功能障碍,会降低行政人员做事的合法性。在这方面,他指出有些参与到绩效审计的政治家会利用媒体而借机夸大政治所得。除此之外,根据市政府法规,审计报告必须首先上交给理事控制委员会的做法也是不可取的。他认为这是对“矛盾原则”的违反。就这个原则陈述的相关部分而言,在报告之前大家都应该能够熟悉文件的内容,以防误解并纠正缺点。 虽然我们的检举人估计在绩效审计中将用到15%-20%的资源,但是从实际情况来看40%-50%才是最为理想的。我们的资金调查与早前挪威的史瑞哲对绩效审计的预期与实际利用结果的研究非常相似。她的报道结果表明:在1995年只有百分之十三的挪威市政审计师的资源用于绩效审计。据她调查,市政审计师宣称绩效审计的预期标准是利用总资源的30%。 绩效审计的预期功能经济性、效率性、效果性只有部分实现。两个主要行政官员认为,表现出不良审计的主要原因是缺乏能够胜任的审计人员。 然而,他们两个也指出审计的质量在最近几年有着显著的提高。另一方面,市政审计师中的被调查者认为,如果进行审计的资源十分充沛的话,那么审计的质量将会令人满意。如果市政审计传统上是检查账簿,那就没有必要提出了解政治制度中内在风险的前提。为了推动这一挑战,市政审计部门在招聘员工时要求其教育背景需偏离传统的审计规章。本招聘策略旨在通过合并以前单一的市政审计部门,从而确定更多的审计人员去加强执行力度,这种策略似乎是一个对提高审计能力的有效措施。市首席行政官员说他的市政区已经开始与相邻的四个直辖市合作设立合并地区的市政审计师,这样做主要是为了提高绩效审计质量。同时,他也描述了一个不成功的绩效审计项目:护理服务。上述问题产生的原因似乎在于方法不对,那些实施方案相对于他们的发现是被夸大了的。 据两位主要行政官员指出,只要有良好的审计报告质量就会起积极效果。一方面,县首席行政官员要对被政治家们和管理部门的领导者使用的报告有很深刻的印象。政府等级越低,那么市政审计人员从中获利就越少。另一方面,首席审计师说,市政审计的领导非常明白,报道在哪里有用,组织就会用它们。但是,现在又一种趋势就是最高层的领导会经常使用它们,因为这些数据直接表明了他们的决定及表现如何。 市政首席执行官指出,绩效审计的边际效用最有可能比传统的财务审计大。随着抽样调查的使用和审计信息技术在这些年的发展,这些都有可能相似的。关于我们的问题是否执行绩效审计能去除传统的审计弊端,被调查者回答说,资源是固定的。从财务审计到绩效审计范围的扩大使得财务审计显得相对不重要,对于上述情况,关于审计师的效果性、效率性、工作机构和管理部门,我们要站在审计师的角度要求增加革新和新思路。因此可以说,市政审计师也将改善他们的执行情况。 关于我们对信息使用的不同见解,我们也无法提出相反的正当理由。我们应当更加关注绩效审查信息和当地政府的目标模糊之间的联系。被审计人员和其他的利益相关者,运用减少不确定性、目标含糊性和增强公共服务的合法性,从而使得使用审计信息的方法符合审计师的使用概念。芬兰和挪威两例都提供了一些证据。 这似乎直接能得出这样的结论:绩效审计对评估地方政府来说是一个很好的测评工具。使用绩效报告也很好,即使有时候这些报告与预期的有所差距或者只是形式上的。但是与财务审计相比,绩效审计对市县的绩效和管理水平的提高更有帮助。尤其是,我们的第三个主张在这些研究发现下受到肯定。以我们的数据为基准,以强调管理为评判依据的私人会计事务所在芬兰自治审计市场来看好像已经形成了一种风格,即绩效审计。而挪威相较于芬兰则不同,由于被审计人员参与度的不够,审计人员更倾向于公共会计师的风格。 我们认为我们的研究从理论和实践两方面做出了解释,绩效审计如何在政治组织机构中发挥工具性和政治性作用。第一,必须提出一个问题:对当地政府来说,绩效审计以何种程度来评判他是对或是不对。这是一个重要的未来可能陷入困境的问题。如果没有明确的目标审计怎么办?正如在芬兰的例子中发现的那样,这个是绩效审计领域的一部分。从经济性、效率性、效果性的观点来看,并不是所有的问题事前都被考虑成是重要的。服务质量,公平性,公正性和相关的评价标准事后发现才是重要的。有许多问题在制定规定和进行分配时没有显得很重要,但是当审计时就会发现其重要性了。从审计角度来看,就能清晰地了解地方政府在目标设定时为何强调金钱的重要性。这同样适用于地方政府活动的绩效测量与评价,并以此来提高地方当局的行政绩效。这样一来,对应急费用的模糊处理不应该武断的认为是标志性现象,而应该用积极地,进化的,政治的角度去探索。 其次,在当地政府绩效审计的现代形式可能仍然是比较新的。随着时间的推移,人们或许希望更宽松的但更高度合理的使用审计信息。这就意味着在不同的组织机构下,不同的人会根据当时的条件雇佣不同的审计人员,使用不同的信息。例如:执政党、多数派,可以选择和披露绩效审计,如果它证实物有所值。同时,政治反对派、少数派,媒体可以选择和利用信息战略时,如果资料显示货币价值低。这两种合理使用政治的局面,是利用在市、县信息外部连接到内部机构。而这种进程可以提高冲突水平,并揭示出不同的意识形态冲突,这或许能准确地表达什么政治制度管理模式应该做什么,预期或非预期的布鲁森,1989年。然而,如果它是让地方政府绩效审计如我们描述的那样在工作中用合理和对应的方法,那么从长远来看,这还可能导致一种绩效审计的成功悖论。 在绩效审计成功悖论中的逻辑就是, 虽然评审员可能是由社会中相对成功的代理人担任,他们提供绩效信息作为公共财产,起着监督民主和透明性的作用,但是社会不是同构实体。公民有不同的偏好,不同的政党和利益团体也有他们不一样的宣言和议程。