胡塞尔为大英百科全书撰写的“现象学”条目.doc

胡塞尔为大英百科全书撰写的“现象学”条目（1927）_ 胡塞尔应邀为大英百科全书撰写现象学条目，并邀请海德格尔合作。然而这是一次不怎么愉快的合作，二者在现象学方面的一些根本性分歧第一次显现。为此，海德格尔专门致信胡塞尔陈说解释，然而学术上的争论不可避免。稍后，胡塞尔在海德格尔赠给他的存在与时间扉页上无奈地写下了亚里士多德的名言“吾爱吾师柏拉图，吾更爱真理”。“phenomenology,” edmund husserl's article for the encyclopaedia britannica* (1927) revised translation by richard e. palmer1 introduction 1. pure psychology: its field of experience, its method and its function 1. pure natural science and pure psychology. 2. the purely psychical in self ;experience and community experience. the universal description of intentional experiences. 3. the self ;contained field of the purely psychical. ;phenomenological reduction and true inner experience. 4. eidetic reduction and phenomenological psychology as an eidetic science. 5. the fundamental function of pure phenomenological psychology for an exact empirical psychology. il. phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology 6. descartes' transcendental turn and locke's psychologism. 7. the transcendental problem. 8. the solution by psychologism as a tran?scendental circle. 9. the transcendental ;phenomenological reduction and the semblance of transcendental duplication. 10. pure psychology as a propaedeutic to transcendental phenomenology. iii transcendental phenomenology and philosophy as universal science with absolute foundations 11. transcendental phenomenology as ontology. 12. phenomenology and the crisis in the foundations of the exact sciences. 13. the phenomenological grounding of the factual sciences in relation to empirical phenomenology. 14. complete phenomenology as all? embracing philosophy. 15. the “ultimate and highest” problems as phenomenological. 16. the phenomenological resolution of all philosophical antitheses. husserl's introductions to phenomenology introduction the term 'phenomenology' designates two things: a new kind of descriptive method which made a breakthrough in phi?losophy at the turn of the century, and an a priori science derived from it; a science which is intended to supply the basic instru?ment (organon) for a rigorously scientific philosophy and, in its consequent applica?tion, to make possible a methodical reform of all the sciences. together with this philo-sophical phenomenology, but not yet sepa?rated from it, however, there also came into being a new psychological discipline parallel to it in method and content: the a priori pure or “phenomenological” psychology, which raises the reformational claim to be?ing the basic methodological foundation on which alone a scientifically rigorous empiri?cal psychology can be established. an out?line of this psychological phenomenology, standing nearer to our natural thinking, is well suited to serve as a preliminary step that will lead up to an understanding of philo?sophical phenomenology. i. pure psychology: its field of experience, its method, and its function 1. pure natural science and pure psychology. modern psychology is the science dealing with the “psychical” in the concrete context of spatio ;temporal realities, being in some way so to speak what occurs in nature as ego?ical, with all that inseparably belongs to it as psychic processes like experiencing, think?ing, feeling, willing, as capacity, and as habitus. experience presents the psychical as merely a stratum of human and animal be?ing. accordingly, psychology is seen as a branch of the more concrete science of an?thropology, or rather zoology. animal reali?ties are first of all, at a basic level, physical realities. as such, they belong in the closed nexus of relationships in physical nature, in nature meant in the primary and most preg?nant sense as the universal theme of a pure natural science; that is to say, an objective science of nature which in deliberate one ;sidedness excludes all extra ;physical predi?cations of reality. the scientific investiga?tion of the bodies of animals fits within this area. by contrast, however, if the psychic as?pect of the animal world is to become the topic of investigation, the first thing we have to ask is how far, in parallel with the pure sci?ence of nature, a pure psychology is possible. obviously, purely psychological research can be done to a certain extent. to it we owe the basic concepts of the psychical according to the properties essential and specific to it. these concepts must be incorporated into the others, into the psychophysical founda?tional concepts of psychology. it is by no means clear from the very out?set, however, how far the idea of a pure psychology ;-as a psychological discipline sharply separate in itself and as a real paral?lel to the pure physical science of nature has a meaning that is legitimate and neces?sary of realization. 2. the purely psychical in self ;experience and community experience. the universal description of intentional experiences.to establish and unfold this guiding idea, the first thing that is necessary is a clar-ification of what is peculiar to experience, and especially to the pure experience of the psychical ;and specifically the purely psy?chical that experience reveals, which is to become the theme of a pure psychology. it is natural and appropriate that precedence will be accorded to the most immediate types of experience, which in each case reveal to us our own psychic being. focusing our experiencing gaze on our own psychic life necessarily takes place as re?flection, as a turning about of a glance which had previously been directed else-where. every experience can be subject to such reflection, as can indeed every manner in which we occupy ourselves with any real or ideal objects ;for instance, thinking, or in the modes of feeling and will, valuing and striving. so when we are fully engaged in conscious activity, we focus exclusively on the specific thing, thoughts, values, goals, or means involved, but not on the psychical experience as such, in which these things are 23 known as such. only reflection reveals this to us. through reflection, instead of grasping simply the matter straight-out-the values, goals, and instrumentalities-we grasp the corresponding subjective experiences in which we become “conscious” of them, in which (in the broadest sense) they “appear.” for this reason, they are called “phenomena,” and their most general essential character is to exist as the “consciousness-of” or “appearance-of” the specific things, thoughts (judged states of affairs, grounds, conclusions), plans, decisions, hopes, and so forth. this relatedness of the appearing to the object of appearance resides in the meaning of all expressions in the vernacular languages which relate to psychic experience -for instance, perception o/something, recalling of something, thinking of something, hoping/or something, fearing something, striving for something, deciding on something, and so on. if this realm of what we call “phenomena” proves to be the possible field for a pure psychological discipline related exclusively to phenomena, we can understand the designation of it as phenomenological psychology. the terminological expression, deriving from scholasticism, for designating the basic character of being as consciousness, as consciousness of something, is intentionality. in unreflective holding of some object or other in consciousness, we are turned or directed to-wards it: our “intentio” goes out towards it. the phenomenological reversal of our gaze shows that this “being directed” gerichtet-sein is really an immanent essential feature of the respective experiences involved; they are “intentional” experiences. an extremely large and variegated number of kinds of special cases fall within the general scope of this concept. consciousness of something is not an empty holding of something; every phenomenon has its own total form of intention intentionale gesamtform, but at the same time it has a structure, which in intentional analysis leads always again to components which are themselves also intentional. so for example in starting from a perception of something (for example, a die), phenomenological reflection leads to a multiple and yet synthetically unified intentionality. there are continually varying differences in the modes of appearing of objects, which are caused by the changing of “orientation”-of right and left, nearness and farness, with the consequent differences in perspective involved. there are further differences in appearance between the “actually seen front” and the “unseeable” “unanschaulichen” and relatively “undetermined” reverse side, which is nevertheless “meant along with it.” observing the flux of modes of appearing and the manner of their “synthesis,” one finds that every phase and portion of the flux is already in itself “consciousness-of '-but in such a manner that there is formed within the constant emerging of new phases the synthetically unified awareness that this is one and the same object. the intentional structure of any process of perception has its fixed essential type seine feste wesenstypik, which must necessarily be realized in all its extraordinary complexity just in order for a physical body simply to be perceived as such. if this same thing is intuited in other modes-for example, in the modes of recollection, fantasy or pictorial representation- to some extent the whole intentional content of the perception comes back, but all aspects peculiarly transformed to correspond to that mode. this applies similarly for every other category of psychic process: the judging, valuing, striving consciousness is not an empty having knowledge of the specific judgments, values, goals, and means. rather, these constitute themselves, with fixed essential forms corresponding to each process, in a flowing intentionality. for psychology, the universal task presents itself: to investigate systematically the elementary intentionalities, and from out of these unfold the typical forms of intentional processes, their possible variants, their syntheses to new forms, their structural composition, and from this advance towards a descriptive knowledge of the totality of mental process, towards a comprehensive type of a life of the psyche gesamttyplts eines lebens der seele. clearly, the consistent carrying out of this task will produce knowledge which will have validity far beyond the psychologist's own particular psychic existence. psychic life is accessible to us not only through self-experience but also through 24 experience of others. this novel source of ex?perience offers us not only what matches our self ;experience but also what is new, inas?much as, in terms of consciousness and in?deed as experience, it establishes the differ?ences between own and other, as well as the properties peculiar to the life of a commu?nity. at just this point there arises the task of also making phenomenologically under?standable the mental life of the community, with all the intentionalities that pertain to it. 3. the self ;contained field of the purely psychical. -phenomenological reduction and true inner experience. the idea of a phenomenological psychol?ogy encompasses the whole range of tasks arising out of the experience of self and the experience of the other founded on it. but it is not yet clear whether phenomenological experience, followed through in exclusive?ness and consistency, really provides us with a kind of closed ;off field of being, out of which a science can grow which is exclusively focused on it and completely free of every?thing psychophysical. here in fact difficul?ties do exist, which have hidden from psy?chologists the possibility of such a purely phenomenological psychology even after brentano's discovery of intentionality. they are relevant already to the construction of a really pure self ;experience, and therewith of a really pure psychic datum. a particular method of access is required for the pure phenomenological field: the method of ”phe?nomenological reduction.“ this method of phenomenological reduction” is thus the foundational method of pure psychology and the presupposition of all its specifically theoretical methods. ultimately the great difficulty rests on the way that already the self ;experience of the psychologist is every?where intertwined with external experience, with that of extra ;psychical real things. the experienced “exterior” does not belong to one's intentional interiority, although cer?tainly the experience itself belongs to it as experience ;of the exterior. exactly this same thing is true of every kind of awareness directed at something out there in the world. a consistent epoche of the phenomenologist is required, if he wishes to break through to his own consciousness as pure phenomenon or as the totality of his purely mental pro?cesses. that is to say, in the accomplishment of phenomenological reflection he must in?hibit every co ;accomplishment of objective positing produced in unreflective conscious?ness, and therewith inhibit every judg?mental drawing ;in of the world as it “exists” for him straightforwardly. the specific expe?rience of this house, this body, of a world as such, is and remains, however, according to its own essential content and thus insepara?bly, experience “of this house,” this body, this world; this is so for every mode of con?sciousness which is directed towards an object. it is, after all, quite impossible to de?scribe an intentional experience ;even if il?lusionary, an invalid judgment, or the like ;without at the same time describing the object of that consciousness as such. the universal epoche of the world as it becomes known in consciousness (the “putting it in brackets”) shuts out from the phenomeno-logical field the world as it exists for the sub?ject in simple absoluteness; its place, how?ever, is taken by the world as given in con?sciousness (perceived, remembered, judged, thought, valued, etc.) ;the world as such, the “world in brackets,” or in other words, the world, or rather individual things in the world as absolute, are replaced by the re?spective meaning of each in consciousness bewusstseinssinn in its various modes (per?ceptual meaning, recollected meaning, and so on). with this, we have clarified and supple?mented our initial determination of the phenomenological experience and its sphere of being. in going back from the unities pos?ited in the natural attitude to the manifold of modes of consciousness in which they ap?pear, the unities, as inseparable from these multiplicities ;but as “bracketed” ;are also to be reckoned among what is purely psychi?cal, and always specifically in the appearance?-character in which they present themselves. the method of phenomenological reduc?tion (to the pure “phenomenon,” the purely psychical) accordingly consists (1) in the me?thodical and rigorously consistent epoche of every objective p