今日讲义目的汇总课件.ppt
Oligopoly Theory 7. Spatial Competition in Mixed Oligopoly,今日講義目的（）混合寡占文脈Spatial Competition Model e再確認（）Spatial Competition 文脈混合寡占特徴再確認,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,1,Oligopoly Theory 7. Spatial,Outline of the 7th Lecture,7-1 Shopping Model in Mixed Duopoly7-2 Endogenous Cost Differentials in Mixed Duopoly 7-3 Local Public Firm and Equilibrium Location7-4 Elastic Demand and Equilibrium Location in Mixed Duopoly 7-5 Shipping Model in Mixed Oligopoly7-6 Foreign Competition and Differentiation 7-7 Location Equilibrium in Quasi-Linear City,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,2,Outline of the 7th Lecture7-1,Shopping Model,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,3,Shopping ModelOT:Mixed Oligopo,Shopping Model in Mixed Duopoly,Duopoly Model、長直線都市。公企業（企業）。私企業（企業）。私企業国内企業。移動費用距離乗比例。各消費者単位財企業企業購入。企業利得総余剰、企業利得自社利潤。両企業限界費用一定（費用格差）。各企業第期独立立地決 。立地見後第期Bertrand競争。shopping model,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,4,Shopping Model in Mixed Duopol,Maximal Differentiation in Private Duopoly,企業立地,企業立地,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,5,Maximal Differentiation in Pri,Why Maximal Differentiation in Private Duopoly?,企業少離（）企業需要価格弾力性小企業価格上（直接効果）（）企業需要価格弾力性小企業価格上企業最適価格上（間接効果、戦略的効果）効果離誘因生Hotelling示需要量減少効果dominate最大距離均衡生,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,6,Why Maximal Differentiation in,Mixed Duopoly,公企業自分需要分割効率的配慮問題：Second Stage競争考（立地所与）。私企業（企業）価格P2所与公企業最適価格？（最適反応？）,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,7,Mixed Duopoly公企業自分需要分割,脱線：私企業外国企業？,問題：Second Stage競争考（立地所与）。海外私企業（企業）価格P2所与公企業最適価格？（最適反応？）,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,8,脱線：私企業外国企業？問題：Second Stag,Mixed Duopoly,First Stage企業離（）企業需要価格弾力性小企業価格上 Private Duopoly存在直接効果消（）企業需要価格弾力性小企業価格上企業最適価格上（間接効果、戦略的効果）Private Duopoly比離誘因小,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,9,Mixed DuopolyFirst StageOT:Mix,Efficient Differentiation in Mixed DuopolyCremer et al (1991),企業立地,企業立地,3/4,1/4,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,10,Efficient Differentiation in M,Endogenous Cost Differentials between Public and Private Firms Matsumura and Matsushima (2004),設定生産費用内生化以外Cremer et al (1991)Duopoly version同。Hotelling, Shopping Model, Domestic Private Firm (Firm 2), Public Firm (Firm 1) 企業費用内生化：企業努力費用下。努力disutility伴（）費用削減努力（）立地選択（）価格競争,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,11,Endogenous Cost Differentials,Maximal Differentiation in Private Duopoly at the second stage,企業立地,企業立地,費用given極端費用格差限均衡立地費用格差時同,費用格差？純粋戦略均衡無（第講参照）,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,12,Maximal Differentiation in Pri,Mixed Duopoly,Third Stage 公企業自分需要分割効率的配慮問題：Third Stage競争考（立地所与）。仮c1c2。私企業（企業）価格P2所与公企業最適価格？（最適反応？） P1= P2, P1 P2, P1 P2,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,13,Mixed DuopolyThird Stage OT:Mi,Mixed Duopoly,Second Stage 問題：Second Stage考（費用所与）。仮c1c2。効率的立地？（均衡立地限）X1= 1/4, X1 1/4, X1 3/4, X2 3/4,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,14,Mixed Duopoly Second Stage OT:,Efficient and Equilibrium Differentiation in Mixed Duopoly at the second stage,企業立地,企業立地,費用givenfirst bestoutcome実現均衡立地性質費用格差時同,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,15,Efficient and Equilibrium Diff,First stage in Private Duopoly,両私企業努力過小。企業費用下企業価格下企業価格下（戦略的補完）企業損失,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,16,First stage in Private Duopoly,First Stage in Mixed Duopoly,私企業努力過大公企業私企業間費用格差生。企業費用下企業端立地(second stage)、高価格(third stage)効率的企業市場譲企業利益戦略的理由多（過大）投資誘因公企業民営化厚生改善可能性,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,17,First Stage in Mixed Duopoly 私,脱線：Kitahara and Matsumura (unplublished),公企業立地,私企業立地,3/4,1/4,linear city, mill pricing, elastic demand, constant marginal cost, no cost asymmetry, quadratic transport inefficient location (too close,私企業少離Welfare改善),OT:Mixed Oligopoly,18,脱線：Kitahara and Matsumura (unp,Local Public Firm in Mixed DuopolyInoue et al (2009),企業Local Public Firm。企業域外私企業。以外Cremer et al (1991)同設定。,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,19,Local Public Firm in Mixed Duo,Local Public Firm,1/2,域内,域外,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,20,Local Public Firm1/2域内域外OT:M,Behavior of Local Public Firm,実質外国企業 more aggressive。域外消費者高売。価格差別出来。less aggressive,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,21,Behavior of Local Public Firm,Behavior of Local Public Firm,実質外国企業 more aggressive。域外消費者高売。価格差別出来。less aggressive,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,22,Behavior of Local Public Firm,Results,（）Multiple Equilibria均衡：公企業域内真中、私企業域外端立地均衡：公企業域内右端、私企業域内端立地（）均衡Payoff Dominant（）全体（域内）余剰均衡大,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,23,Results （）Multiple Equilibria,均衡,1/2,域内,域外,1/4,公企業立地,私企業立地,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,24,均衡1/2域内域外1/4公企業立地私企業立地OT:,均衡,1/2,域内,域外,1/4,公企業立地,私企業立地,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,25,均衡1/2域内域外1/4公企業立地私企業立地OT:,Intuition behind multiple equilibria,私企業best response私企業競争避遠立地（私企業域外企業依存）公企業域外消費者抱less aggressive私企業域内（）立地 公企業距離十分出来遠、。公企業best response私企業域外立地域内消費者transport cost減域内中心近。私企業域内立地高価格域外消費者稼境界近。,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,26,Intuition behind multiple equi,各均衡性質,均衡：比較的高価格両企業利得大。域外消費者犠牲上高利得。全体余剰均衡小。,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,27,各均衡性質 均衡：比較的高価格両企業利得大。,Shipping Model in Mixed Oligopoly,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,28,Shipping Model in Mixed Oligop,Shipping Model in Mixed Oligopoly Matsushima and Matsumura (2003),Oligopoly Model、長円環都市。各点線形需要関数。輸送費用距離比例。限界費用一定。企業利得総余剰、私企業利得自社利潤。各企業第期独立直線都市上立地決 。立地見後第期期Cournot競争。shipping modelPal (1998)mixed oligopoly version,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,29,Shipping Model in Mixed Oligop,Equilibrium Location (Duopoly),一般性失企業立地,企業最適反応考,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,30,Equilibrium Location (Duopoly),Equilibrium Location (Duopoly),一般性失企業立地,企業均衡立地,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,31,Equilibrium Location (Duopoly),Equilibrium Location (Oligopoly),一般性失企業立地,私企業集積,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,32,Equilibrium Location (Oligopol,Linear City？,公企業立地,私企業立地,私企業立地,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,33,Linear City？公企業立地私企業立地私企,Linear City？,公企業立地,私企業立地,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,34,Linear City？公企業立地私企業立地OT,外国企業？Matsushima and Matsumura (2006),Matsushima and Matsumura (2003)私企業何社外国企業？,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,35,外国企業？Matsushima and Matsu,Equilibrium Location(外国企業社),一般性失企業立地,私企業集積,外国企業,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,36,Equilibrium Location(外国企業社)一般,Equilibrium Location(外国企業社),一般性失企業立地,国内私企業戦略変,外国企業,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,37,Equilibrium Location(外国企業社)一般,Equilibrium Location(外国企業社),一般性失企業立地,外国企業間differentiation,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,38,Equilibrium Location(外国企業社)一般,General Model of Linear and Circular City,0,1/2,跨時費用,Circular, 十分大Linear。最初本質的同。,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,39,General Model of Linear and Ci,Matsushima and Matsumura (2003),0,1/2,Private Firms,Public Firm,Private Firms, =0,=1,1/10,9/10,Private Firms,delivered pricing, linear demand,constant marginal cost, no cost asymmetry, linear transport cost, Cournot, domestic private firms,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,40,Matsushima and Matsumura (2003,Results,0,1/2,Private Firms,Public Firm,Private Firms, =0,2/5,1/10,9/10,Private Firms,delivered pricing, linear demand,constant marginal cost, no cost asymmetry, linear transport cost, Cournot,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,41,Results01/2Private FirmsPublic,Results,均衡立地jump円線2/5結果線同線型都市適用領域広partial agglomeration現、円結果=0時成立円極特殊？,OT:Mixed Oligopoly,42,Results均衡立地jump円線,
